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H – 815

International Court of Justice

#1 of 2 General Staff English

Notice.

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Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

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N O T E.

I herewith certify that the documents contained in the document book are true copies or excerpts.

Nuremberg, July 14th 1946

(Dr. Hans Laternser)

H0815 - 0004

I N D E X

to document books I and II

relative to the defense of the Group General Staff and Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.

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Document Mil 1

Filed August 21, 1946

S P E E C H

given by the General of the Artillery, B e c k on 15 October 1935 in commemoration of the 125th anniversary of the War-Academy, quoted from the "Berliner Boersenzeitung" of 16 October 1935.

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During the 100th anniversary of the Royal Prussian Academy of War, in Dorotheenstrasse, 25 years ago today, the then Colonel General Count von Schlieffen marked the day of Jena as the cause of its origin. The lack of generalship and leaders in the Prussian Army which had revealed itself on the battle field on 14 October 1806, was to be remedied by it for future times. Four years later on 15 October 1810, the "Allgemeine Kriegsschule" on Burgstrasse commenced instruction. Selected officers were henceforth to finish their education in their military profession as well as along general scientific lines taking into consideration the requirements of modern times.

The "Allgemeine Kriegsschule", later called the "War Academy" was the highest military school for the Prussian and later on for the German Army up to the great war. General von Scharnhorst is considered its founder. An "Academy for young officers" had been created already in 1804 upon his endeavours ---- too late admittedly, to bear fruit prior to the disastrous year of 1806.

Count von Schlieffen and all those who listened to his masterful speech on 15 October 1910 could not perceive that this Academy was to be doomed to its death, scarcely nine years later by a dictate of 27 enemy states, filled with hatred. The Royal Bavarian War Academy which, founded in 1866 was erected on 19 July 1867 in Munich, guided by the Russian example met the same fate.

However, just as the greatest defeat of the Prussian army became the foundation for its marvellous resurrection, so the hour of death of our old magnificent army on 28 July 1919 led to the new life of the young "Reichsheer" in the sense of the declaration of Clausewitz:

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"that a people in most circumstances is unconquerable in its magnominous fight for its liberty, that even the destruction of this liberty after a violent and honourable fight secures the rebirth of this people."

The reason for the downfall of liberty, for the loss of the great war was not, as it had been in 1806, a military failure. Rather the old German army returned from the war crowned with the laurels of immortality.

In the rebirth of the new army it was therefore not so important to find new ways, as was done in 1806, but rather to continue from those factors which made up the tremendous military superiority of the old army:

m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p a n d a h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d r a n k a n d f i l e .

It was in this sense, that the highest leaders surviving the end of the old army tackled the problem of the shackled 100.000 men army forced upon them, in the period of transition. It was above all General von S e e c k t , the historical creator of the new army, who looked upon his mission in this light when on 6 July 1919 he took over the tasks of Chief of the General Staff of the army for a short time and later on solved them as Chief of the "Allgemeine Truppenamt" resp. as Chief of the High Command of the army. He not only created from the small German army an exemplary army feared and admired throughout the world and laid the military cornerstone for the present rebuilding of the army but also from the beginning devoted all his care to the p r e s e r v a t i o n a n d f u r t h e r a n c e o f a G e n e r a l S t a f f and a military leadership of high standard.

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Upon his suggestion a training of officers such as the one by the former war academy was being considered again already in November 1919. It was to take place at the staff's of the corps area headquarters and these were to be provided with special instructors.

In summer 1920, after an examination, the first pupils were selected who were found able to be assistants of the higher army commanders. On 1 October 1920 the training began which was at first intended to last two years. On 1 October 1923 a third training year in the Reichswehr Ministry was added. This training of, now again, three years has been carried out from this date on for nine years, partly along new lines. On 1 October 1932 the concentration of all leader assistants training courses (Führergehilfenlehrgänge) was effected in the "Officer training courses Berlin" in the former court house in the Lehrter Street, as the former War Academy building had soon after the end of the war to be used for other purposes.

S i n c e 1 May 1935 t h e s e t r a i n i n g c o u r s e a g a i n b e a r t h e n a m e " W a r A c a d e m y " Hereby the connection with the old pattern was, also outwardly, established again and the young army of the Reich had again also toward the outside world that important training college for higher education to which the old German Army owed so much.

How great military leaders of all times had developed may be left undecided. It is, however, certain that the road from the military apprentice, over the journeyman to the master, especially in recent and most recent times had to be and will be covered in continuous careful and minute mental work. In this sense the word of General Field Marshall von M o l t k e applies: " G e n i u s i s w o r k!" "This is" as Schlieffen 25 years ago said " the statement of a man,

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who after 65 years of uninterrupted work used the evening of his life to lick 2 great powers".

It may also be stated that from 15 October 1810 the largest part of the officers who had responsible positions in the army and whose names are for all times connected with the development, the glory and the victories of the former Prussian-German army, graduated from the War Academy or worked there.

Generals such as Moltke, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, organizers like Scharnhorst and Roon, teachers like Clausewitz, Verdy, Blume, Goltz, Bernhardi, Schlieffen the great teacher of the general staff around the turn of the century, to name only a few of the best known, finally the largest part of the high commanders and of their chiefs of staff in the world war, all of them come from the war academy or taught there or influenced it decisively in a leading position.

But however indispensable a rich and solid knowledge, i n t h e l a r g e s p h e r e o f m o d e r n m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e, acquired through quiet work in peace times may be, such t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e is only the first step for real skill. The latter must be acquired by itself. S c h a r n h o r s t knew this already when he founded the "General War Training School". It later found a special champion in Clausewitz who fought against the introduction of the life of university students into the high minded military training school without being able to prevail against the mentality of those times. Only gradually did the practical application of those ideas, self evident to-day, succeed.

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However because the recognition of a right thought does not at the same time always means its execution, so also on this day of remembrance may we draw attention to the fact that the transition from knowledge to capability, to the free creative activity based on science of the high soldier Fuehrer demands as a first presupposition the e d u c a t i o n a n d s c h o o l i n g o f t h e s p i r i t directed by military science. The comprehension and treatment of military questions, in all ramifications down to their roots in s y s t e m a t i c m e n t a l w o r k , penetrating the problem in a step by step advance, conscientiously safeguarding the conquered ground, is an indispensable demand. Today more then ever this demand must be made of every person who is to be a leader. It is but after its fulfilment that the right foundation is given to the joy in taking responsibilities, in independence and independent activity of the leaders.

Such systematic thinking needs to be carefully learnt and practiced. To just this the years spent at the war-academy should contribute. Nothing would be more dangerous then to give in to jumpy inspirations that have not been thought out to their end, however prudent or ingenious they may seem or to construct upon wishful thoughts be they ever so hotly cherished.

W e n e e d o f f i c e r s , w h o g o a l o n g t h e w a y o f l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s i n m e n t a l , s y s t e m a t i c d i s c i p l i n e t o t h e e n d a n d w h o s e c h a r a c t e r a n d n e r v e s a r e s t r o n g e n o u g h t o e x e c u t e , w h a t t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e d i c t a t e s .

" A strong spirit", says Clausewitz, "is not such a one, that is only capable of strong emotions, but that one

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which under strongest emotions remains in an e q u i l i b r i u m, so that in spite of the storms in the breast the most delicate variations are allowed to i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d c o n v i c t i o n as to the needle of a compass on a storm tossed ship."

The coup d'oeil in times past so justly praised the socalled "lightning recognition of the moment", may certainly in the future still be of high importance in some situations in the war on land, in general, however, it will be of lesser value, at least in higher grades of leadership, than clear, clever recognition of the needs of the situation ripened from mental work, taking into consideration all possibilities. Such mental discipline is not sickly from the "paleness of the thought", it rather supplies the " native color of decision" with the necessary fundamentals. It is only that way that for reasons of intelligence great, courageous, heroic decisions originate, only that way also losing is ennobled by the "pride of a glorious fall." Also systematical thought is by no means opposed to mental versatility. Because also the suppleness in making decisions to exploit circumstances, which from the beginning were to be influenced, or not to be foreseen with certainty, the adaptability to a changed situation, the presence of mind in incidents, the insensibility against defeat have as a precondition, foresight and preparatory work of the mind if they are to be rewarded by success.

That is what we admire so much in the great Moltke, what makes him a m o d e l f o r a l l o f f i c e r s in specially responsible positions : the earnest, thorough weighing before the courageous risking, the inner assuredness, originating from being ready and prepared for anything that may happen, the subtle tact in judgement which hits true in the mist of uncertainties because they guess and discover the reality.

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To quote once more Clausewitz's words: "The more exalted a leader, the more it becomes necessary th t valor be accompanied by a thinking mind, so that the former shall not be devoid of purpose, shall not be a blind thrust of passion; indeed, a more exalted position involves less a purely personal sacrifice than it implies the maintenance of other people and the welfare of the great Community".

In such an education of mind and soul of our leaders for clear, logical thought and energetic action I perceive the highest and most important task of the Military Academy. It is my wish that this institution may, now and in the future, just as in former times, fulfil this task under the rather much changed conditions of a future war.

Concerning this latter circumstance, another idea forces itself upon my mind.

The world war, the changed development of the nations and of their mutual relations caused by it, as well as the mighty p r o g r e s s i n t h e s c i e n c e o f e n g i n e e r i n g already made and still expected, have had everywhere a revolutionary influence upon the conception of the essence of future warfare and its conduct. Accordingly, the views concerning the command of the ground forces have also been subject to the changes of time, since July 1914, when the old military academy closed its gates, and in many respects those views have suffered incisive changes. The responsible authorities are faced with new problems of such dimensions, both in time and in extension, that the past does not offer any example for them. Accordingly, the programs and themes of the Military Academy have already suffered far-reaching changes in post-war time. And they will still have to be adapted, in the future, to the impetuous evolution, after having been ripely thought over and decided. This, however, renders any teaching of the elements of warfare and this latter itself gradually more complex and difficult than has been the case in the lecture rooms of the Military Academy of 25 years ago.

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It is true that on one hand the attractiveness of instruction and its interest has been, for the true soldier, but improved by this, but on the other hand, such an instruction is always asking more, both from teachers and from students. Therefore, one needs to a particular extent a clear-sighted view, in order to be able to separate the immaterial from the essential, and to keep, among the abundance of new suggestions and ideas, a sober and independent judgment and a sane power of conception.

I should, therefore, like to point out in this connection, and on the occasion of to-day's commemoration, that it is often but the form which is subject to change, but that the basic principles of military leadership in war were the same at all times and shall remain so, and furthermore, that war has been, and will be, borne by men, which implies dependence on his physical powers as well as on those of soul and mind, together with his environment. Therefore, such points of view, particularly the decisive preponderance of psychical factors, may not be neglected in comparison with directives and principles of future military conduct of war, which are to be explained in a speculative way. Otherwise, there would appear a danger that the commander-in-chief and his assistant does not reckon with things as they are, but as he likes to see them.

For the grasping of the essence and the conduct of war, and not last of the moral factors commanding both of them, the history of war will always remain, insofar as one cannot use one's own experience, the inexhaustible fountain, the history of war, of which Schlieffen repeatedly pointed out that it teaches us, how everything came to pass, how it had to be and how it always will be.

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That, however, already the history of the world war cannot be considered any more o n l y from the viewpoint of a battle by the mutual military forces but by the entire national power of the enemy, also of its economic and psychological power should be a urgent warning to all instructors and students of the young Wehrmacht to the

r e a l i t y o f a f u t u r e w a r .

In that case the Wehrmacht will always represent only part of the powers, needed by a nation wanting to survive in a life and death struggle.

When, 25 years ago, the 100th anniversary of the war academy was celebrated, the superiors present at the time could look with confidence to the work of this institution and thereby also into the future. The same prevails for the former academy as did for the old army that it kept what had been expected: Its members have justified during the war the confidence which was put into them and the remaining members can think with pride of their former membership in the war academy as one of the most instructive and valuable parts of their life.

Today too, the military minded (wehrbewusst) nation, the leaders and the other superiors look with assurance to the newly born war academy. Many of us shall not live to witness the judgement which will be passed on it in another 25 years.

But I believe and conclude with this wish for its further development: that also in the future it will be evident that the confidence put into it will be justified and that it, now as then, keeps in readiness the leaders and assistent leaders for the Army, on whom our Supreme Commander, also Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Commander in Chief of the Army can depend completely on in all circumstances.

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May the officers who go through the war academy always be conscious of the proud tradition of this institution, as well as of the duty which they owe to the man who re-created and made strong again the German Wehrmacht, who finally took the fetters of Versailles from it and to the new State which assures us a stronger then ever foundation in a united nation if some day again only the call to arms should be left for the defense of the fatherland.

In this sense I congratulate the War Academy on its jubilee today.

Filed August 21, 1946

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Document Mil 2

Nuernberg, 13 July 1946

Theodor B u s s e
General of the Inf.

A F F I D A V I T

I, General of the Infantry Theodor B u s s e, born on 15 December 1897,
being duly sworn, depose and say:

The inclosed drawing about the construction of the former German Wehrmacht reproduces correctly the actual chain of command in the highest command of the Wehrmacht.

signed Theodor B u s s e
(Theodor Busse)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13 day of July 1946

signed Paul S. Burger
Capt., O - 451219

I, Emma W. Schabenland, duly conversant with the English and German Languages, testify, that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

signed Emma W. Schwabenland

Armed Forces High Command (O.K.W.)

Hitler

4 departments W.F.St. = Wehrmacht Fuehrungsstab
Armed Forces Operations Staff.

Ob.d.H.
C. in C. of the Army

Army High Command
4 Offices | Chief of General Staff

C. in C. of an Army Group

Chief of Staff
Staff | General Staff

C. in C. of an Army

Chief of Staff
Staff | General Staff

Comm. General of an Army - Corps

Chief of Staff
Staff | General Staff

Commander of a Division

Staff | General Staff

C. in C. of the Navy

3 Main Officers incl. Naval War Staff

C. in C. of a Naval Group Command.

Staff

C in C of the Air Force

3 Offices

Air Force High Command
Chief of General Staff
Air Force Operations Staff | Q.M. General | Chief Signal Off. | Chief Air. Armements

C.C. of an Air Fleet

Chief of Staff
Staff of Air Fleet Command.

Comm. General of an Air Corps

Chief of Staff
Staff Corps Command

Commander of an Air Division

Div. Staff

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Filed august 21, 1946

Document Nil 3

August W i n t e r
General of Mountain-troops

AFFIDAVIT

I, August W i n t e r, born 18.1.1897 in Munich, being duly sworn, depose and say as follows to the enclosed drawing "Waging of war "(chain of command and scope of tasks) :

The above sketch of the limitation of tasks and scope of responsibility in the second world-war is drawn up to the best of my knowledge. Included are also the change which, as far as clearness made it possible, were carried out during the war.

As former deputy, chief of the Wehrmacht Executive Staff, (Wehrmachtsfuchrungsstab),I am informed as to the dividing up of competences.

(signed August W i n t e r)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13 day of July 1946

(signed Paul S. Burger
Capt., O - 451219

I, Emma W. Schwabenland, duly conversant with the English and German languages, testify, that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

(signed Emma W. Schwabenland

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E X T R A C T

from

Document USA 778

presented on 2 March 1946

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THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND

Corrigenda

Please add the following to the list of the names of officers included in the General Staff and High Command group:

High Command of the Armed Forces

Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff	Lt.General WINTER	Sept.44-May 45

Commanders in Chief of Army Groups and Armies

Name	Appointments			Dates
	Army Group	Army	Theatre	
Gen.CHRISTIANSEN Friedrich (GAF)		25	West	Apr.45-May 45
Col.Gen.v.FALKENHORST, Nikolaus		21	Norway	Apr.41-May 45
Gen.KUEBLER, Ludwig		4	East	41-42
x F.M. ROMMEL, Erwin	B	Pz.Army	Africa West	Dec.41-May 43 Nov.43-July 44
Col.Gen.STRAUSS, Adolf		9	West/ East	May 40-Jan.42
Gen.v.TIPPELSKIRCH, Kurt		1	West	Oct.44-May 45

F.M. von BOCK should be marked as dead.

These corrections raise the total figure of members of the General Staff and High Command group to 131 of whom 114 are thought to be still alive. Detailed figures are:

		Total	Living
Staff Officers	OKW	4	4
	OKH	6	5
	OKM	5	5
	OKL	6	3
Commanders in Chief	Army	89	76
	Navy	15	15
	Air Force	11	10

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The German General Staff and High Command

Herewith are the names of all officers who held any of the positions designated in Appendix B of the Indictment. Officers who have since died are included with a x against their names. The total number of officers involved is 124 of whom 109 are believed to be living. By services the figures are:

		Total	Living
Staff Officers	OKW	3	3
	OKH	6	5
	OKM	5	5
	OKL	6	3
Commanders in Chief	Army	83	72
	Navy	15	15
	Air Force	11	10

Army Commanders in Chief include one or two officers drawn from the Air Force or SS. Hitler, C-in-C of the Army from December 1941 is excluded.

Ranks given are the highest achieved during the war.

High Command of the Armed Forces

Chief	Field Marshal KEITEL, Wilhelm.	5/2/38 - May 45
Chief of the Operations Staff	Col.General JODL, Alfred	Aug. 39- May 45
Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff	Lt.Gen.v.WARLIMONT, Walter .	April 41 - Sept.44

High Command of the Army

C-in-C	Field Marshal v. BRAUCHITSCH, Walter	Feb.38-Dec.41
Chief of the General Staff x	Col.General BECK	? 34-Sept.38
	Col.General HALDER, Franz.	Sept. 38 - Sept. 42
	Col.General ZEITZLER, Kurt.	Sept. 42 - July 44
	Col.General GUDERIAN Heinz	July 44 -Feb.
	General KREBS, Hans	Feb.45- May 45

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High Command of the Navy

C-in-C	Admiral of the Fleet RAEDER, Erich	May 35-31.1.43
	Admiral of the Fleet DOENITZ, Karl	1.2.43 May 45
Chief of Staff of the Naval war Staff	Admiral SCHNIEWIND, Otto	? 38 12.6.41
	Admiral FRICHE, Kurt	12.6.41 Jan 43
	Admiral MEISEL, Wilhelm	Feb. 43 - May 43

High Command of the Air Force

C-in-C	Reichsmarshal Goering, Hermann	March 35 - April 1945
	X Field Marshal Ritter v. GREIN, Robert	April 45 May 45
Chief of the General Staff	Col General STUMPFE,	June 35 - Feb 39
	x Col General JESCHONNEK,	Feb 39 - Nov 43
	x Col General Korten,	Nov 43-20.7.44
	General Kreipe, Werner	Aug 44 - Oct 44 -
	General Koller, Karl	Oct 44- May 45

Commanders in Chief of Army Groups and Armies.

Name	Appointments Army Group	Army	Theatre	Dates
Gen. Allmendinger, Karl		17	East	May 44-Jul 44
Gen. Angelis, Maximilian		2.	Pz. Balkans	Oct 44-Apr 45
Col. Gen. v. Armin Juergen,		5.	Pz. Atrica	Dec 42-May 43
Gen. Balck Hermann		4.	Pz. East	Jul 44-Aug 44
	G		West	Oct 44-Dec 44
Col Gen Blaskowitz, Johannes	2		Poland	Oct 39
		9	West	May 40-June 40
		1	West	Oct 40 May 44
	G		West	May 44-Sep 44
				Dec 44-Jan 45
	H		West	Jan 45-Apr 45
Gen, Blumentritt, Guenther	25		West	Jan 45-Mar 45
FM. v. Bock, Fedor	B		Poland France	Sept 39-Dec 44
	South		East	Jan 42-Jul 42
Gen Boege? Ehrenfried		18	East	Sept 44-May 45
Gen Boehne,		2	Pz Balkans	June 44-July 44
		20	Mtn Norway	Jan 45-May 45

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Name	Appointments		Dates
	Army Group	Army Theatre	
Gen,Brandenberger Erich		7 West	Aug 44
		19 West	Mar 45-May 4
x FM.Busch, Ernst		16 East	Oct 39-Oct 43
Gen Busse, Theodor		9 East	Jan 45-May 45
Gen.v.d.Chevallerie,Kurt		1 Pz East	Apr 44-May 44
x Col Gen Dietl, Edward		20 Mtn Finland	Jan 42-June 44
Oberstgruf. Dietrich,Josef		6 SS Pz West/East	Oct 44-Apr 4
x Col Gen Dollmann,Friedrich		7 West	Sept 39-June 4
Gen Foertsch, Hermann		1 West	Mar 45-May 45
Gen Fretter-Pico,Maximilian		6 East	July 44-Dec 44
Col Gen Friessner, Johannes			
	S. Ukraine (renamed South)		East Juli 44-Dec 44
Col Gen Guderian, Heinz		2 Pz East	Oct 41-Jan 42
Gen Graser, Fritz		4 Pz East	Sept 44-May 45
x Col Gen Haase,Kurt		15 West	Jan 41-Jan43
Gen Hansen, Christian		16 East	Oct 43-Jul 44
Col Gen Harpe, Josef		9 East	Nov 43
		4 Pz East	May 44-June 44
	N. Ukraine	East	June 44-Jan 45
	(renamed North)	5 Pz West	Mar 45-Apr 45
Gen Hasse, Wilhelm		17 East	Apr 45-May 45
Oberstgruf. Hausser, Paul		7 West	Jul 44-Aug 44
Col Gen Heinrici, Gotthard		4 East	Jan 42-Jul 44
		1 Pz East	Aug 4 -Mar 45
	Vistula	East	Mar 45-Apr 45
Gen Hilpert, Karl		16 East	Sept 44-Jan 45
			Jan 45-Apr 45
x RFSS Himmler, Heinrich	Upper Rhine Vistula		Late 44
			Early 45
x Col Gen Hoepner, Erich		4 Pz East	Oct 41-Jan 42
Col Gen Hollidt,Karl		6 East	Mar 43-Apr 44
Gen Hossbach, Friedrich		4 East	Jul 44-Jan 45
Col Gen,Hoth, Hermann		17 East	Oct 41-Jan 42
		4 Pz East	Feb 42-Dec 43
x Col Gen Hube,Hans		1 Pz East	Oct 43-Feb 44
Col Gen Jaenicke, Erwin		17 East	Jun 43-May 44
F.M. Kesselring, Albert	South	Italy	June 43-Oct 44
	(renamed C)		Jan 45-Mar 45

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	Name	Army Group	Army	Theatre	Dates
	Gen.Kleffel,Philipp		25	West	Mar.45-Apr.45
	F.M.v.Kleist,Ewald	A	1 Pz	Balkans	Nov.40-Nov.42
		A		& East	
				East	Nov.42-Mar.43
x	F.M.v.Kluge,Guenther		4	Poland	Sept.39-Dec.41
				West &East	
	Gen.v.Knobelsdorff, Otto		1	West	Sept.44-Dec.44
	Gen. Kreysing,Hans		8	East	Dec.44-May45
	F.M.v.Kuechler, Georg	North	18	West/East	Nov.39-Sept.41
				East	Jan.42-Jan.44
	F.M.Ritter v.Leeb, Wilhelm	C		West	Sept.39-?
		North		East	Jul.41-Jan.42
	Gen.Lemelsen, Joachim		1	West	May 44
			14	Italy	June 44
			10	Italy	Oct.44
			14	Italy	Feb.45-May 45
	Col.Gen.Lindemann, Georg	North	18	East	Jan.42-Mar.44
				East	Mar.44-Jul.44
	F.M.List,Wilhelm		12	West	Sept.39-Jun
		A		East	June 42-Dec.
	Gen.Loch,Herbert		18	East	Mar.44-Sept.
	Col.Gen.Lochr , Alexander		12	Balkans	Jul.42-Dec.42
		E		Balkans	Dec.42-? 44
	Gen.Lucht,Walter.		11	East	Mar.45-May 4
	Col.Gen.v.Mackensen, Eberhard.		1Pz	East	Nov.42-Mar.43
			14	Italy	Nov.43-June
	F.M.v.Lewinski,genannt v.Manstein Fritz	Don	11	East	Sept.41-Nov.
		South		East	Nov.42-Jan.
				East	Jan.43-Mar..
	Gen.v.Manteuffel,Hasso		5 Pz.	West	Sept.44-Jan.4
			3 Pz.	East	Mar.45-May 45
	F.M.Model,Walter		9	East	Jan.42-Nov.43
		North		East	Jan.44-May 44
		North Ukraine		East	May.44-June 4
		Centre		East	June 44-Sept.
		B		West	Sept.44-Apr.4
	Gen.Mueller,Friedrich		4	East	Jan.45-May 45
	Gen.Nehring,Walter		1 Pz.	East	Mar.45-Apr.45
	Gen.v.Obstfelder,Hans.		1	West	Dec.44
			19	West	March 45
			7	West	Mar.45-May 45
	F.M.Paulus,Friedrich		6	East	Feb.42-Feb.43
	Gen.Rasp,Siegfried.		19	West	Dec.44-Mar.45

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	Name	Army Group	Army	Theatre	Dates
	Col.Gen.Raus, Erhard.		4 Pz.	East	Dec.43
			1	West	May 44
			3 Pz.	East	Aug.44-Mar.4
x	F.M.v.Reichenau, Walter		10	Poland	Sept.39
			6	West/East	May 40-Jan.4
	Col.Gen.Reinhard,	Hans	3Pz.	East	Oct.41-Aug.4
		Centre		East	Aug.44-Jan.
	Col.Gen.Rendulic, Dr.Lothar.		2Pz.	Balkans	Aug.42-Jun
			20 Mtn	Finland	June 44-Ja
		Kurland		East	Jan.45
		North		East	Jan.45-Mar.
		Kurland		East	Mar.45-Apr.4
		South		East	Apr.45-May4
	F.M.v.Rundstedt, Gerd	South		Poland	Sept.39-
		A		West	Apr.40-June
		South		East	June 41-Dec.
		D		West	Mar.42-Jul.4
					Sept.44-Ma
	Col.Gen.Ruoff, Richard.		4 Pz.	East	Jan.42
			17	East	May 42-June
	Col.Gen.v.Salmuth, Hans.		2	East	July 42-Feb.
			15	West	Aug.43-Aug.4
	Gen.v.Sauchen, Dietrich .		2	East	Mar.45-May 4
	Col.Gen.Schmidt, Rudolf		2 Pz.	East	Jan.42-Jul.4.
	Gen.Schlemm,Alfred.		1 Para	West	Nov.44-May
x	Col.Gen.Ritter v. Schobert,Eugen		11	East	June 41-Sep
	F.M.Schoerner, Ferdinand	A		East	Mar.44-May 4
		S.Ukraine		East	May 44-Jul.4
		Kurland		East	Jul.44-Jan.4
		Centre		East	Jan.45-May 4
	Gen.Schulz,Friedrich.		17	East	Jul.44-Apr.4
	Gen.v.Sodenstern,	Georg.	19	West	Aug.43-June
	Ogruf.Steiner,Felix		11	East	? 45
	Col.Gen.Student,Kurt.		1 Para	West	Feb.44-Nov.
		H		West	Dec.44-Jan
x	Gen.v.Stuelpnagel Heinrich.		17	East	Feb.41-Oct.
	Gen.v.Vietinghoff, genannt Scheel,Heinrich		15	West	Feb.42-Aug.4
			10	Italy	Aug.43-Oct.4
		C		Italy	Oct.44-Jan45
		Kurland		East	Jan.45-Mar.4
		C		Italy	Mar.45-May 4
	F.M.Frhr.v.Weichs, Maximilian		2	Poland.	Oct.39-Jul.42
				France	
				Balkans	
				East	
		B		East	Jul.42-Jul.43
		F		Balkans	Aug.43-May 4

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	Name	Army Group	Army	Theatre	Dates
	Col.Gen.Weiss,Walter	North	2	East East	Febr.43-Mar.4 Mar.45-Apr.4
	Gen.Wenck,Walter		12	East	Apr.45-May 4.
	Gen.Wiese,Friedrich		19	West	June 44-Dec.4
x	F.M.v.Witzleben, Erwin.		1	West	Apr.40-Oct.40
	Gen.Woehler,Otto.		8	East	Nov.43-Dec.44
	Gen.v.Zangen,Gustav.		15	West	Aug.44-May 4
		Commanders in Chief in the Navy			
	Admiral of the Fleet Boehm , Hermann	Naval Chief Command Norway			Febr.43-Mar.4
	Admiral of the Fleet Carls, Rolf	Naval Group Command North			July 40-Febr.
	Admiral Ciliax,Otto	Naval Chief Command Norway			Mar.43-May 4
	Admiral Densch,Herman	C-in-C N.Sea Station			Febr.43-
	Admiral Foerste,Erich	C-in-C N.Sea Station			Mar.43-May 4.
	Admiral Fricke,Kurt	Naval Group Command South			Mar.43-Dec.4
	Admiral Guse,Guenther	C-in-C Baltic Station			Febr.43-Mar.4
	Admiral Krancke,Theodor	Naval Group Command West			Apr.43-Oct.44
		Naval Chief Command West			Oct.44-May 4
	Admiral of the Fleet Kummetz,Oskar	C-in-C Baltic Station			Mar.44-Dec.4
	Vice-Admiral Lowwisch Werner	Naval Chief Command South			Jan.45-May
	Admiral of the Fleet Marshall,Wilhelm	Naval Group Command West			Sept.42-Apr.
	Admiral of the Fleet Saalwachter,Alfred	Naval Group Command West			Aug.39-Sept.
	Admiral Schmundt,Hubert	C-in-C Baltic Station			Mar.43-Mar.44
	Admiral Schniewind,Otto.	Naval Group Command North Fleet			Feb.43-Apr.44
	Admiral Schuster,Karl Georg	Naval Group Command South			Jul.41-Mar.4
		Commanders in Chief in the Air Force			
	Col.Gen.Dessloch,Otto	Luftflotte 4			Mar.43-Sept.4
		Luftflotte 3			Sept.44-Oct.4
		Luftflotte 4			Oct.44-May 4.
	F.M.Ritter v.Greim,Robert	Luftflotte 6			Mar.43-May 4
	Col.Gen.Keller,Alfred	Luftflotte 1			Apr.40-? 43
	F.M.Kesselring,Albert	Luftflotte 1			Sept.39-Apr.
		Luftflotte 2			Apr.40-Mar.4
	Col.Gen.Loehr,Alexander	Luftflotte 4			Sept.39-Jul.
	Gen. Pflugbeil,Kurt	Luftflotte 1			? 43-May
	F.M.v.Richthofen	Luftflotte 4			Jul.42-Mar.4
		Luftflotte 2			Mar.43-Aug.4
	Gen.Seidel	Luftflotte 10			Oct.44-May 4
	F.M.Sperrle , Hugo	Luftflotte 3			Sept.39-Aug.
	Col.Gen.Stumpff,Hans Juer-gen	Luftflotte 5			Apr.40-Feb.4
		Luftflotte Reich			Feb.44-May

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Filed August 21, 1946

Document Mil 4

Nuernberg, 11 June 1946

Gen. of the Inf. Th. B u s s e

A F F I D A V I T

I, General of the Infantry, Theodor B u s s e, born 15 December 1897, hereby state under oath, that the tables, I, II, III containing a diagram of the composition of the alleged "Group General Staff and OKW" were drawn up by me to the best of my knowledge according to the declarations of the document of the prosecution "USA 778 - Affidavit to accompany Memorandu on the German General Staff and High Command" and which was presented on 2 March 1946 .

signed Th. B u s s e

(Theodor Busse)

I certify that this is the true signature of Gemral Th. Busse.

13 June 46

signed Robert B. Stannes

1st Lt. Inf.

Ch. Prison Officer

I. GRAPHIC CHART of membership with the so called group General Staff and OKW during a certain period

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Total	1.3.1933	1.3.1935	1.3.1938	1.9.1939	1.4.1940	22.6.1941	The highest number of simultaneous membership reached around Nov. 1944	Number of generals belonging at one time to the group



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Graphic chart of the <u>length</u> of membership with the so called group General Staff and OKW

	10 years and longer	8 3/4 yrs.	7 1/4 yrs.	6 yrs.	5-5 1/2 yrs.	4 yrs.	3-3 1/2 yrs.	2-2 1/2 yrs.	1 1/2 - 1 3/4 yrs.	1 - 1 1/2 yrs.	3/4 yrs.	1/2 yrs.	5 month	4 month	3 month	2 month	1 month	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
129																		
	2	2	1	1	7	6	10	21	9	13	14	16	3	8	3	9	4	

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Chart III. Comparative condensation (Length of membership)

	From the number in column belonged to the so called group General Staff and OKW.			
1	2	3	4	5
Total number of members established by the prosecution	6 years and longer	3 - 6 years	1 - 2 years	less than 1 year
129	6	23	43	57



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Filed August 21, 1946

Document Mil 6

Nuernberg, 11 July 1946

August Winter
General of Mountain-troops

Subject: The holding of positions within the Group General Staff /OKW on important key-days.

I, August W i n t e r , born 18 January 1897 in Munich, state under oath to the enclosed list No 1 :

To the best of my knowledge I compiled in the inclosure - list No 1 - , who of the generals and admirals, listed in document US 778, actually occupied positions in the socalled "Group" General Staff / OKW on certain,-according to the prosecution , especially important key-days.

With regard to the periods of affiliation to the group, I deviated in individual cases from those stated in document US 778, when I had at my disposal more unobjectionable, more accurate particulars through personal knowledge or questionnin of officers.

1. In positions of the group were only:

a) on 1.3.1933	(at the time of assumption of power)	1General
b) on 5.2.1938	(alleged beginning of the socalled conspiracy)	6 Generals
c) on 1.9.1939	(Beginning of the Polish campaign)	23 Generals
d) on 1.4.1940	(Period of preparation for the occupation of Norway and the campaign in the West	25 Generals
e) on 22.6.1941	(Beginning of the Russian campaign)	30 Generals
f) on 1.11.1944	(highest number ever reached of affiliation to the group at the same time)	49 Generals

2. According to that, not even half of the accused persons wer in positions with the group on any of the important key-day listed above.

H0815-0034

(signed August Winter)

.....

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day 13 July 1946

.....

(signed Paul S. Burger

I, Emma W. Schwabenland duly conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

.....

(signed Emma W.Schwabenland

H0815 - 0035

List 1

There belonged to the "Group" on :

		1.3. 1933	5.2. 1938	1.9. 1939	1.4. 1940	22.6. 1941	1.11. 1944
Gen.Feldmarschall	KEITEL		x	x	x	x	x
Generaloberst	JODL			x	x	x	x
General	WARLIMONT					x	x
Generalleutnant	WINTER						
Gen. Feldmarschall	v.BRAUCHITSCH		x	x	x	x	
Generaloberst	HALDER			x	x	x	
Generaloberst	ZEITZLER						
Generaloberst	GUDERIAN						x
General	KREBS						
Grossadmiral	RAEDER	x	x	x	x	x	
Grossadmiral	DOENITZ						x
Generaladmiral	SCHNIEWIND			x	x		
Admiral	FRICKE						x
Admiral	MEISEL						x
Reichsmarschall	GOERING	x	x	x	x	x	x
Generaloberst	STUMPF	x					x
General	KREIPE						
General	KOLLER						x
General	ALMENDINGER						
General	de ANGELIS						x
Generaloberst	v. ARNIM						
General	BALCK						x
Generaloberst	BLASKOWITZ			x			
General	BLUMENTRITT						
General	BOEGE						x
General	BOEHME						
General	BRANDENBERGER						x

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		1.3. 1933	5.2. 1938	1.9. 1939	1.4. 1940	22.6. 1941	1.11. 1944
General	BUSSE						
General	FOERTSCH						
General	v.d.CHEVALLERIE						
Oberstgruppenführer	DIETRICH						x
General	FRETTER-PICO						x
Generaloberst	FRIESSNER						x
General	GRAESER						x
General	HANSEN						
Generaloberst	HARPE						x
General	HASSE						
Oberstgruppenführer	HAUSSER						
Generaloberst	HEINRICI						x
Reichsfuehrer SS	HIMMLER						
General	HILPERT						x
Generaloberst	HOLLIDT						
General	HOSSBACH						x
Generaloberst	HOTH						
Generaloberst	JAENICKE						
Gen. Feldmarschall	KESSELRING	x	xx		x	x	x
General	CHRISTIANSEN						
Generaloberst	v. FALKENHORST			x		x	
General	KLEFFEL						
Gen. Feldmarschall	v. KLEIST	x		x			
General	v. KNOBELSDORFF						

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		1.3. 1933	5.2. 1938	1.9. 1939	1.4. 1940	22.6. 1941	1.11. 1944
General	KREYSING	.	.	.	.	.	.
General	KUEBLER						
Gen. Feldmarschall	v.KUECHLER			x	x	x	
Gen.Feldmarschall	RITTER v.LEEB			x	x	x	
General	LEMELSEN						x
Generaloberst	LINDEMANN						
Gen.Feldmarschall	LIST			x	x	x	
General	LOCH						
Generaloberst	LOEHR			x	x	x	xx
General	LUCHT						
Generaloberst	v.MACKENSEN						
Gen.Feldmarschall	v.MANSTEIN					x	
General	v.MANTEUFFEL						x
General	MUELLER, friedrich						
General	NEHRING						
General	v.OBSTFELDER						
Gen.Feldmarschall	PAULUS						
General	RASP						
Generaloberst	RAUSS						x
Generaloberst	REINHARDT						x
Generaloberst	RENDULIC						x
Gen.Feldmarschall	v.RUNDSTEDT			x	x	x	x
Generaloberst	RUOFF						
Generaloberst	v.SALMUTH						
General	v.SAUCKEN						
Generaloberst	SCHMIDT						

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		1.3. 1933	5.2. 1938	1.9. 1939	1.4. 1940	22.6. 1941	1.11. 1944
General	SCHLEMM	.	.	.	.	.	x .
Gen.Feldmarschall	SCHOERNER						x
General	SCHULZ, Friedrich						x
General	v.SODENSTERN						
Obergruppenführer	STEINER						
Generaloberst	STRAUSS					x	
Generaloberst	STUDENT						x
General	v.TIPPELSKIRCH						x
General	v.VIETINGHOFF						x
Gen.Feldmarschall	v.WEICHS			x	x	x	x
Generaloberst	WEISS						x
General	WENCK						
General	WIESE						x
General	WOEHLER						x
General	v.ZANGEN						x
Generaladmiral	BOEHM						
Generaladmiral	CARLS					x	
Admiral	CLEMAX						x
Admiral	DENSCH						
Admiral	FOERSTE						xx
Admiral	GUSE						
Admiral	KRANCKE						x
Generaladmiral	KUMMETZ						x
Vizeadmiral	LOEWISCH						
Generaladmiral	MARSCHALL						

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		1.3. 1933	5.2. 1938	1.9. 1939	1.4. 1940	22.6. 1941	1.11. 1944
Generaladmiral	SAALWAECHTER			x	x	x	
Admiral	SCHMUNDT						
Admiral	SCHUSTER						
Generaloberst	DESSLOCH						x
Generaloberst	KELLER				x	x	
General	PFLUGBEIL						x
General	SEIDEL						x
Gen.Feldmarschall	SPERRLE			x	x	x	
Gen.Feldmarschall	v. BOCK			x	x	x	
Gen.Feldmarschall	v.REICHENAU			x	x	x	
Gen.Feldmarschall	v.KLUGE			x	x	x	
Gen.Feldmarschall	ROMMEL						
Gen.Feldmarschall	v.WITZLEBEN				x		
Gen.Feldmarschall	MODEL						x
Gen.Feldmarschall	BUSCH					x	
Generaloberst	BECK	x					
Generaloberst	HOEPPNER						
Generaloberst	v.SCHOBERT					x	
Generaloberst	DIETL						
Generaloberst	HUBE						
Generaloberst	HAASE					x	
Generaloberst	DOLLMANN			x	x	x	
General	v.STUELPNAGEL					x	
Gen.Feldmarschall	v.GREIM						
Gen.Feldmarschall	v.RICHTHOFEN						
Generaloberst	JESCHONNEK			x	x	x	
General	KORTEN						

H0815 - 0040

filed August 21, 1946

Document Mil 7

August Winter
General of Mountain troops

Nuernberg, July 11th, 1946

Concerns: Membership in group ("Gruppe")
General Staff OKW during
some periods (list No.2)

I, August Winter, born January 18th 1897 in Munich, make the following affidavit, concerning attached list No.2:

Basing myself on document USA 778 - supplemented by affidavits, by oral and written statements of individual officers and by personal knowledge - I have established, in enclosed list 2, to the best of my knowledge and conscience the membership of generals and admirals of the so-called group ("Gruppe") during some periods of rearmament and war, which are important in the meaning of the indictment. The enclosure shows the following:

1) a) from June 1941 onwards (begin of Russian campaign), i.e. in the period of rearmament and the beginning of the campaign, there were 33 persons in "Gruppe" positions. 2 are still alive;

b) between June 41 and Feb. 1st 43 (fall of Stalingrad), i.e. in the period of offensive operations in some theaters of operations, 27 persons came for the first time in to "Gruppe" positions;

c) between Feb. 1st 1943 and June 1st 1944 (invasion), namely in the period strategical defensive, 29 persons came in to "Gruppe" positions;

d) between June 44 and May 45 (surrender), namely in the period of mere struggle for existence, 40 people came in to "Gruppe" positions.

2) It follows from 1) that:

a) out of 129 officers held to have been members of the alleged "Gruppe", only 33 (25%) could, according to 1)a), have participated in the preparation and the beginning of campaign or of a conspiracy.

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b) out of the mentioned 129 officers 69 (more than 50 %) have filled, according to 1) c) and 1) d), positions in the alleged "Gruppe" at a time only, when a participation in strategical plans of aggression would not have been possible any more.

c) According to 1) d), 40 officers (nearly 30 % of 129) reached positions in the alleged "Gruppe " at a time only, when the German nation was struggling for its existence.

3.5 generals came from the Austrian Federal Army and were taken over by the German Wehrmacht in the spring of 1938 only, after the Anschluss of Austria.

4.2 generals who successively held the positions of "Acting chief WFST", did not possess any powers of command or authority.

5.a) From army and air force came:

	former general staff officers	80 generals
	former officers of the line	27 generals
b)	added hereto:naval officers	18 admirals
c)	added hereto:SS- leaders	4 SS-leaders
		Total 129

(signed) August WINTER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day July 13th 1946

(signed) Paul S.Burger

I, Emma W.Schwabenland, duly conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

(signed) Emma W.Schwabenland

H0815-0042

Membership with the "Group"

during certain periods.

List No. 2

	Before 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/2/1943	Joined only after 1/6/1944	Taken over from the Austrian Federal Army 1938.	Former officers at the General Staff of the Army or the Air Force.
Gfm. KEITEL	x					x
Genob. JODL	x					x
Gen. WARLIMONT	x					x
Genlt. WINTER				x		x
Gfm. v.BRAUCHITSCH	x					x
Genob. HALDER	x					x
Genob. ZEITZLER		x				x
Genob. GUDERIAN		x				x
Gen. KREBS				x		x
Grossadm. RAEDER	x					
Grossadm. DOENITZ			x			
Genadm. SCHNIEWIND	x					
Adm. FRICKE		x				
Adm. MEISEL			x			
Reichsm. GOERING	x					
Genob. STUMPF	x					x
Gen. KREIPE				x		x
Gen. KOLLER				x		x
Gen. ALLENDINGER			x			x
Gen. de ANGELIS			x		x	x
Genob. v.ARNIM		x				x
Gen. BALCK				x		
Genob. BLASKOWITZ	x					x
Gen. BLUMENTRITT				x		x
Gen. BONGE				x		
Gen. BOEHME				x	x	x
Gen. BRANDENBERGER				x		x
Gen. BUSSE				x		x

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	Before 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/6/1943	Joined only after 1/6/1944	Taken over from the Austrian Federal Army 1938.	Former officers of the General Staff of the Army or the Air Force
Gen. FOERTSCH				x		x
Gen. v.d.CHEVALLERIE			x			x
Oberst Gr.F. DIETRICH				x		
Gen. FROTTER-PICO				x		x
Genob. FRIESSNER			x			
Gen. GRAESER				x		
Gen. HANSEN		x				x (?)
Genob. HARPE			x			
Gen. HASSE				x		x
Oberst Gr.F.HAUSSER				x		x
Genob. HEINRICI		x				x
RF. SS HIMMLER				x		
Gen. HILPERT				x		x
Genob. HOLLIDT			x			x
Gen. HOSSBACH				x		x
Genob. HOTH		x				x
Genob. JAENICKE			x			x
Gfm.KESSELRING	x					x
Gen.CHRISTIANSEN				x		
Genob. v.FALKENHORST	x					x
Gen. KIEFFEL				x		x
Gfm. v.KLEIST		x				x
Gen. v.KNOBELSDORFF				x		x
Gen. KREYSING				x		
Gen. KUEBLER		x				x
Gfm. v.KUECHLER	x					x
Gfm. Ritter v.LEEB	x					x
Gen. LEMELSEN			x			

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	Prior to June 1941	Joined only after 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/2/1943	Joined only after 1/6/44	Taken over from the Austrian Federal Army 1938	Former officers at the General Staff of the Army or the Air Force.
Generaloberst LINDEMANN		x				x
General Field Marshal LIST	x					x
General LOCH			x			x
Generaloberst LOHR	x				x	x
General LUCHT				x		
Generaloberst v. MACKENSEN		x				x
General Field Marshal v. MANSTEIN		x				x
General v. MATTENFEL				x		
General MUELLER, Friedr.				x		
General NEHRING				x		x
General v. OBSTFELDER				x		x
General Field Marshal PAULUS		x				x
General PASP				x		x
Generaloberst RAUSS			x		x	x
Generaloberst REINHARDT		x				x
Generaloberst RENDULIC			x		x	x
General Field Marshal v. RUNDSTEDT	x					x
Generaloberst RUOFF		x				x
Generaloberst v. SALMUTH		x				x
General v. SAUCKEN				x		
Generaloberst SCHMIDT		x				x
General SCHLEMM				x		x
General Field Marshal SCHOERNER			x			
General SCHULZ, Friedr.				x		x
General v. SCHWERIN			x			x
Obergruppenfuehrer STEINER				x		
Generaloberst STRAUSS	x					

H0815 – 0045

	Prior to 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/2/1943	Joined only after 1/6/1944	Taken over from the Austrian Federal Army 1938	Former officers at the General Staff of the Army or the Air Force.
Generaloberst STUDENT			x			
General v. TIPPELSKIRCH				x		x
General v. VIETINGHOFF			x			x
General Field Marshal v. WEICHS	x					x
Generaloberst WEISS		x				x
General WENCK				x		x
General WIESE				x		
General WOEHLER			x			x
General v. ZANGEN				x		
Generaladmiral BOEHM			x			
Generaladmiral CARLS	x					
Admiral CILLAY		x				
Admiral DENSCH			x			
Admiral FOERSTE			x			
Admiral GUSE			x			
Admiral FRANCKE			x			
Generaladmiral FUERBETZ			x			
Viceadmiral LOEWISCH				x		
Generaladmiral MARSCHALL		x				
Generaladmiral SAALWAECHTER	x					
Admiral SCHMUNDT			x			
Admiral SCHUSTER		x				
Generaloberst DESSLOCH			x			
Generaloberst KELLER		x				
General PFLUGBEIL			x			
General SEIDEL				x		x

H0815-0046

	Prior to 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/6/1941	Joined only after 1/2/1943	Joined only after 1/6/1944	Taken over from the Austrian Federal Army 1938	Former officers at the General Staff of the Army or the Air Force.
General Field Marshal SPERRLE	x					
General Field Marshal v. BOCK	x					x
General Field Marshal v. REICHENAU	x					x
General Field Marshal v. KLUGE	x					x
General Field Marshal ROMMEL		x				
General Field Marshal v. WITZLEBEN	x					x
General Field Marshal MODEL		x				x
General Field Marshal BUSCH	x					x
Generaloberst BECK	x					x
Generaloberst HOEPPNER		x				x
Generaloberst v. SCHOBERT	x					
Generaloberst DIETL		x				
Generaloberst HUBE			x			
Generaloberst HAASE	x					x
General DOLLMANN	x					x
General Field Marshal v. STUELPNAGEL	x					x
Generaloberst v. GREIM				x		
General JESCHONNECK	x					x
General Field Marshal KORTEN			x			x
v. RICHTHOFEN		x				

H0815-0047

Filed August 21, 1946

DOCUMENT Mil 8

August W i n t e r
General of Mountain Troops

Nuernberg, July 14th, 1946

A F F I D A V I T

Concerns: Personal statements concerning the members of the alleged group (" Gruppe").

I, August W i n t e r , born January 18th 1897 at Munich, make the following affidavit concerning enclosed list No. 3:

Basing myself on document USA 778 - suplemented by affidavits and written and oral evidence of individual officers - I have, to the best of my knowledge and conscience, established in enclosed list 3 personnel data concerning the officers belonging to the alleged "Gruppe" general staff and OKW :

1) It follows from the enclosure that:

a) out of the generals belonging to the alleged "Gruppe" are dead 22

b) on trial as individual defendants 8

c) entrusted with the command of their units only, accordingly not appointed to positions 26

56

2) Between February 5th 1938 and the end of the war lost their positions, either by having been removed by order or by being killed at the front, accidental or natural death or by being made prisoner of war 70

3) In the annex the mention "disgrace" in the column "removed from office" is filled in in all such cases, where a serious disagreement between the officer in question and Hitler was the cause of removal, regardless of the form of such removal.

(signed) August WINTER
. . . . . .

H0815 – 0048

Subscribed and sworn before me this 14th day of July 1946

signed Paul R. FOSTER, 2nd Lt.
O-133562

I, Kveta Likovska, duly conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

(signed) Kveta Likovska

H0815-0049

List 3

P E R S O N A L D A T A

of the members of the so called "GROUP"

		dead	indicted individually	only commissioned with a command	in "Group position" still living	removed from position: date	removed from position: reason
Gen.Feldm.	KEITEL	-	x	-	x	-	-
Genob.	JODL	-	x	-	x	-	-
General	WARLIMONT	-	-	-	x	August 1944	illness
Genlt.	WINTER	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.Feldm.	v.BRAUCHITSCH	-	-	-	x	Dec. 1941	dis-graced
Genob.	ZEITZLER	-	-	-	x	Juli 1944	dis-graced
Genob.	GUDERIAN	-	-	-	x	March 1945	dis-graced
Gen.	KREBS	x	-	-	-	-	-
Grossadm.	RAEDER	-	x	-	x	31.1. 1943	dis-graced
Grossadm.	DOENITZ	-	x	-	x	-	-
Genadm.	SCHNIEWIND	-	-	-	x	1.5. 1944	deactivation of command
Adm.	FRICKE	-	-	-	x	Beginning 45	deactivation of command
Adm.	MEISEL	-	-	-	x	-	-
Reichsm.	GOERING	-	x	-	x	-	-
Genob.	STUMPF	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	KREIPE	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	KOLLER	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	ALMENDINGER	-	-	x	x	Juli 1944	dis-graced
Gen.	de ANGELIS	-	-	-	x	-	-
Genob.	v.ARNIM	-	-	-	x	May 1943	Prisoner of war
Gen.	BALCK	-	-	-	x	-	-
Genob.	BLASKOWITZ	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	BLUMENTRITT	-	-	x	x	-	-
Gen.	BOEGE	-	-	x	x		
Gen.	BOEHME	-	-	-	x	-	-
* Genob.	HALDER	-	-	-	x	Sept. 42	disgraced

H0815-0050

		dead	indicted individually	only commissioned with a command	in "Group position" still living	removed from position: date	removed from position: reason
Gen.	BRANDENBERGER	-	-	x	x	-	-
Gen.	BUSSE	-	-	x	x	-	-
Gen.	FOERTSCH	-	-	x	x	-	-
Gen.	v.d.CHEVALLERIE	-	-	x	x	-	-
Obst.Gr.F.	DIETRICH	-	x	-	x	-	-
Gen.	FRETTER-PICO	-	-	x	x	Dec.44	disgraced
Genob.	FRIESSNER	-	-	-	x	Dec.44	disgraced
Gen.	GRAESER	-	-	-	x		
Gen.	HANSEN	-	-	-	x	Dec.44	resigned mental exhaustion
Genob.	HARPE	-	-	-	x	Fall 44	disgraced, used again with lower rank
Gen.	HASSE	-	-	x	x		
Obst.Gr.F.	HAUSSER	-	-	-	x		
Genob.	HEINRICI	-	-	-	x	29.4.45.	disgraced
Rf.SS.	HIMMLER	x	-	x	-	March 45	-
Gen.	HHILPERT	-	-	x	x	-	-
Genob.	HOLLIDT	-	-	-	x	4.44	disgraced
Gen.	HOSSBACH	-	-	-	x	30.1.45	disgraced
Genob.	HOTH	-			x	Dec.43	disgraced
Genob.	JAENICKE	-	-	-	x	Spring 44	disgraced
Gfm.	KESSELRING	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	CHRISTIANSEN	-	x	-	x		
Genob.	v.FALKENHORST	-	-	-	x	dec.44	deactivation of command

H0815-0051

		dead	indicted individually	only commissioned with a command	in "Group position still living	removed from position: date	removed from position: reason
Gen.	KLEFFEL			x	x		
Gfm.	v.KLEIST	-	-	-	x	April 44	disgraced
Gen.	v.KNOBELSDORFF	-	-	x	x	1.12.44	-
Gen.	KREYSING	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	KUEBLER	-	-	x	x	1942	used again in lower rank
Gfm.	v.KUECHLER	-	-	-	x	Jan.44	disgraced
Gfm.	RITTER v.LEEB	-	-	-	x	17.1. 42	resigned
Gen.	LEMELSEN				x	-	-
Genob.	LINDEMANN	-	-	-	x	3.7. 44	disgraced used again later.
Gfm.	LIST	-	-	-	x	10.9. 42	disgraced
Gen.	LOCH			x	x	-	-
Genob.	LOEHR	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	LUCHT	-	-	x	x	-	-
Genob.	v.MACKENSEN				x	1944	disgraced
Gfm.	v.MANSTEIN	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	v.MANTEUFFEL	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	MUELLER, Friedr.	-	-	x	x	1945	disgraced
Gen.	NEHRING	-	-	x	x	-	-
Gen.	v.OBSTFELDER	-	-	x	x	-	-
Gfm.	PAULUS	-	-	-	x	Jan. 43	Prisoner of war
Gen.	RASP	-	-	x	x	Jan.44	-
Genob.	RAUSS	-	-	-	x	45	disgraced
Genob.	REINHARDT	-	-	-	x	21.1. 45	disgraced

H0815-0052

		dead	indicted individually	only commissioned with a command	in "Group position" still living	removed from position	
						date	reason
Genob.	RENDULIC	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gfm.	v.RUNDSTEDT	-	-	-	x	-	-
Genob.	RUOFF	-	-	-	x	1943	disgraced
Genob.	v.SALMUTH	-	-	-	x	Jan.43	disgraced
Gen.	v.SAUCKEN				x		
Genob.	SCHMIDT	-			x	April 43	disgraced
Gen.	SCHLEMM				x		
Gfm.	SCHOERNER	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	SCHULZ, Friedr.	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	v.SODENSTERN	-	-	-	x	-	illness
Ogr.F.	STEINER	-	-	x	x	-	-
Genob.	STRAUSS	-	-	-	x	Jan.42	
Genob.	STUDENT	-	x	-	x	-	-
Gen.	v.TIPPELSKIRCH	-	-	x	x	-	-
Gen.	v.VIETINGHOFF	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gfm.	v.WEICHS	-	-	-	x	March 45	-
Genob.	WEISS	-	-	-	x	2.4.45	-
Gen.	WENCK	-	-	x	x	-	-
Gen.	WIESE	-	-	x	x	18.12. 44	disgraced
Gen.	WOEHLER	-	-	-	x	7.4.45	disgraced
Gen.	v.ZANGEN	-	-	-	xx		
Genadm.	BOEHM	-	-	x	x	1.2.43	age limit
Genadm.	CARLS	x	-	-	-	1.3.43	age limit
Adm.	CILIAX	-	-	-	x	1.4.45	illness
Adm.	DENSCH	-	-	-	x	1.3.43	age limit

H0815-0053

		dead	indicted individually	only commissioned with a command	in "Group position" still living	removed from position	
						date	reason
Adm.	FOERSTE	-	-	-	x	-	-
Adm.	GUSE	-	-	-	x	1.3.43	age limit
Adm.	KRANCKE	-	-	-	x	-	-
Genadm.	KUMMETZ	-	-	-	x	-	-
Vizeadm.	LOEWISCH	-	-	-	x	-	-
Genadm.	MARSCHALL	-	-	-	x	-	-
Genadm.	SAALWAECHTER	-	-	-	x	1.9.42	age limit and illness
Adm.	SCHMUNDT	-	-	-	x	1.3.44	age limit
Adm.	SCHUSTER	-	-	-	x	1.4.43	age limit
Genob.	DESSLOCH	-	-	-	x	-	-
Genob.	KELLER	-	-	-	x	1943	-
Gen.	PFLUGBEIL	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gen.	SEIDEL	-	-	x	x	no front line C-in-C	
Gfm.	SPERRLE	-	-	-	x	-	-
Gfm.	v.BOCK	x				1942	disgraced
Gfm.	v.REICHENAU	x				1942	heart failure whilst on active service
Gfm.	v.KLUGE	x				1944	suicide
Gfm.	ROMMEL	x				1944	forced suicide
Gfm.	v.WITZLEBEN	x				1944	death penalty
Gfm.	MODEL	x				1945	suicide
Gfm.	BUSCH	x				1945	heart failure
Genob.	BECK	x				1944	forced suicide

H0815-0054

		dead	indicted individually	only commissioned with a command	in "Group position" still living	removed from position: date	removed from position: reason
Gen.Oberst	HOEPPNER	x				1944	death penalty
Gen.Oberst	v.SCHOBERT	x				1941	killed in action
Gen.Oberst	DIETL	x				1944	airplane crash
Gen.Oberst	HUBE	x				1944	airplane crash
Gen.Oberst	HAASE	x					died whilst on active service
Gen.Oberst	DOLLMANN	x				1944	died whilst on active service
Gen.	v.STUELP-NAGEL	x				1944	death penalty
Gfm.	v.GREIM	x				1945	suicide after surrender
Gen.Oberst	JESCHONNEK	x				1943 Aug.	suicide
Gen.	KORTEN	x				July 44	assassination
Gfm.	Frh.v. RICHTHOFEN	x				1944	illness

H0815-0055

Document Mil 9

August Winter
General of Mountain Troops

Nuernberg, 12 July 1946

filed August 21, 1946

Concerns: Short-time assignment to positions in alleged group ("Gruppe").

I, August Winter, born January 18th, 1894 in Munich, make the following affidavit concerning enclosed list No.4:

Basing myself on written evidence at my disposal and on oral statements which, according to personal knowledge, I can consider as unobjectionable, I have drawn in the enclosed list No.4 a list of such officers of the alleged "Gruppe" now on trial, who held their positions but for a very short time.

Out of the generals and admirals belonging to the alleged "Gruppe", 31 have accordingly held their position in the "Gruppe" for less than six months. Most of these 31 officers were only "entrusted with the command", and, therefore, not appointed to their positions; all of these 31 officers held their positions but after January 1st 1942, most of them but during the period 1944/45.

(signed) August WINTER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day 13 July 1946

(signed) Paul S.BURGER Cpt.0451219

I, Emma V.Schwabenland duly conversant with the English and German languages, testify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of above affidavit.

(signed) Emma V. SCHWABENLAND.

H0815-0056

List 4

Worked less than 6 months in positions with the so-called "Group"

	time	remarks
Gen.F.M. KEITEL	-	
Gen.Oberst JODL	-	
Gen. WARLIMONT	-	
Gen.Lt. WINTER	5½ months	
Gen.F.M. v.BRAUCHITSCH	-	
Gen.Oberst HALDER	-	
Gen.Oberst ZEITZLER	-	
Gen.Oberst GUDERIAN	-	
Gen. KREBS	1½ months	
Grand Adm.RAEDER	-	
Grand Adm. DOENITZ	-	
Gen.Adm. SCHNIEWIND	-	
Adm. FRICKE	-	
Adm. MEISEL	-	
Reich Marshal GOERING		
Gen.Oberst STUMPFF	-	
Gen. KREIPE	2 months	
Gen. KOLLER	6 months	
Gen. ALMENDINGER	3 months	(held only field command)
Gen. de ANGELIS	-	
Gen. Oberst v. ARNIM	5½ months	
Gen. BALCK	-	
Gen.Oberst BLASKOWITZ	-	
Gen. BLUMENTRITT	3 months	(held only field command)
Gen. BOLGE	-	
Gen. BOEHME	4 months	
Gen. BRANDENBERGER	-	

H0815-0057

	time	remarks
Gen. BUSSE	3½ months	(held only field command)
Gen. FOERTSCH	3 months	(held only field command)
Gen. v.d. CHEVALLERIE	2 months	(held only field command)
Obergruppenfuehrer DIETRICH	-	
Gen. FRETTER-PICO	-	
Gen.Oberst FRIESSNER	-	
Gen. GRAESER	-	
Gen. HANSEN	-	
Gen.Oberst HARPE	-	
Gen. Hasse	2 months	(held only field command)
Obergruppenfuehrer HAUSSER	-	
Gen.Oberst HEINRICI	-	
Reich Fuehrer SS HIMMLER	4 months	(held only field command)
Gen. HILPERT	-	
Gen.Oberst HOLLIDT	-	
Gen. HOSSBACH	-	
Gen.Oberst HOTH	-	
Gen.Oberst JAENICKE		
Gen.F.M. KESSELRING	3 months	(held only field command)
Gen. CHRISTIANSEN	2 months	(held only field command)
Gen.Oberst v. FALKENHORST	-	
Gen. KLEFFEL	2 months	(held only field command)
Gen.F.M. v. KLEIST.	-	
Gen. v. KNOBELSDORFF	3 months	(held only field command)
Gen. KREYSING	5 months	
Gen. KUEBLER	a few days	(held only field command)
Gen. F.M. v. KUESCHLER	-	
Gen. F.M. RITTER v. LEEB	-	

H0815-0058

		time	remarks
Gen.	LEMELSEN	-	
Generaloberst	LINDEMANN	-	
Gen.F.M.	LIST	-	
Gen.	LOCH	-	
Generaloberst	LOEHR	-	
Gen.	LUCHT	½ months	(held only field command
Generaloberst	v.MACKENSEN	-	
Gen.F.M.	v.MANSTEIN	-	
Gen.	v.MANTEUFEL	-	
Gen.	MÜLLER,Friedr.	4 months	(held only field command
Gen.	NEHRING	1 months	(held only field command
Gen.	v.OBSTFELDER	5½months	(held only field command
Gen.F.M.	PAULUS	-	
Gen.	RASP	3 months	(held only field command
Generaloberst	RAUSS	-	
Generaloberst	REINHARDT	-	
Generaloberst	RENDULIC	-	
Gen.F.M.	v.RUNDSTEDT	-	
Generaloberst	RUOFF	-	
Generaloberst	v.SALMUTH	-	
Gen.	v.SAUCKEN	3 months	(held only field command
Generaloberst	SCHMIDT	-	
Gen.	SCHLEMM	6 months	
Gen.F.M.	SCHOERNER	-	
Gen.	SCHULZ,Friedr.	-	
Gen.	v.SODENSTERN	-	
Obergruppenführer	STEINER	1 months	(held only field command
Generaloberst	STRAUSS	-	
Generaloberst	STUDENT	-	
Gen.	v.TIPPELSKIRCH	5 months	(held only field command

H0815-0059

	time	remarks
Gen.v.VIETINGHOFF	-	
Gen.Field Marshal v.WEICHS	-	
Generaloberst WEISS	-	
General WENCK	1 month	(held only field comma.
General WIESE	5½ months	(held only field command)
General WOEHLER	-	
General v.ZANGEN	-	
General Adm.BOEHM	0 days	
General Adm.CARLS	1 month	
Admiral CILLIAX	-	
Admiral DENSCH	1 month	
Admiral FOERSTE	-	
Admiral GUSE	1 month	
Admiral KRANCKE	-	
General Adm. KUMMETZ	-	
Viceadmiral LOEWISH	5 months	
General Adm. MARSCHALL	-	
General Adm. SAALWAECHTER	-	
Admiral SCHMUNDT	-	
Admiral SCHUSTER	-	
Generaloberst DESSLOCH	-	
Generaloberst KELLER	-	
General PFLUGBEIL	-	
General SEIDEL	-	
Gen.F.M. SPERRLE	-	
Gen.F.M. v.BOCK	-	
Gen.F.M. v.REICHENAU	-	
Gen.F.M. v.KLUGE	-	

H0815-0060

		time	remarks
Gen.F.M.	ROMMEL	-	
Gen.F.M.	v.WITZLEBEN	-	
Gen.F.M.	MODEL	-	
Gen.F.M.	BUSCH	-	
Generaloberst	BECK	-	
Generaloberst	HOEPPNER	4 months	
Generaloberst	v.SCHOBERT	4 months	
Generaloberst	DIETL	-	
Generaloberst	HUBE	5 months	
Generaloberst	HAASE	-	
Generaloberst	DOLLMANN	-	
Gen.	v.STUELPNAGEL	-	
Gen.F.M.	v.GREIM	½ months	
Generaloberst	JESCHONNEK	-	
Gen.	KORTEN	-	
Gen.F.M.	v.RICHTHOFEN	-	

H0815-0061

Document Mil 10

August W i n t e r
General of the Mountain Troops

Nuernberg, 13 July 1946

Filed August 21, 1946

AFFIDAVIT.

Concerning : Seniority of officers belonging to the "Group" at the times of special events. (List 5)

I, August W i n t e r, born 18 January 1897 at Munich, declare in regard to the attached list 5 under oath :

In the attached list I have, to the best of my knowledge compiled the grades of the officers (107) still living and belonging to the "Group" at the time when decisions in the foreign policy were made 1935-1939 (beginning of the war), as far as my own knowledge and the material at my disposal made it possible.

This material consisted of written replies to the questionnaire of the defense counsel and verbal statements from the circle of imprisoned officers. The statement regarding the admirals was made by General-Admiral Schniewind, the statement regarding the generals of the air-force was made by General Koller - both from memory. There is a possibility of some insignificant inaccuracies in the list.

The results of the compilation are :

1) Of 107 living officers, on 1 September 1939 (beginning of the war) there were still

Majors	4		
Lieutenant Colonels	11	47	staff-officers
Colonels	32		
Brigadier Generals	18		
Major Generals	14	48	Generals
Lieutenant Generals	16		
Generals (full)	5		
Field Marshals	2	7	top ranks
No information available on		5	
Total number of those living		107	

H0815-0062

2) Accordingly larger is the percentage of staff officers and younger generals in the years preceding the war, - for the compilation of which only incomplete data are available. Thus there were :

a) at the time of the declaration of military sovereignty (Wehrhoheit) 1935 :

of 48 officers contacted :	5	captains	
	1	majors	
	18	lieutenant colonels	
	16	colonels	- 40 lower ranks
	2	brigadier generals	
	1	major general	
	5	lieutenant generals	- 8 generals

b) at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland 1936 :

Of 39 officers contacted :	3	captains	
	2	majors	
	13	lieutenant colonels	
	11	colonels	- 29 lower ranks
	5	brigadier generals	
	2	major generals	
	2	lieutenant generals	
	1	general (full)	- 10 generals

c) at the time of the "Anschluss" of Austria 1938 :

Of 60 officers contacted :	2	captains	
	4	majors	
	7	lieutenant colonels	
	24	colonels	- 37 lower ranks
	10	brigadier generals	
	5	major generals	
	7	lieutenant generals	
	1	generals (full)	- 23 generals

d) at the time of the march into Sudetenland 1938 :

Of 51 officers contacted :	2	captains	
	4	majors	
	4	lieutenant colonels	
	20	colonels	- 30 lower ranks
	10	brigadier generals	
	3	major generals	
	7	lieutenant generals	
	1	generals (full)	- 21 generals

H0815-0063

e) at the time of the occupation of the protectorate 1939 :

Of 49 officers contacted :

1	captain	
5	majors	
22	colonels	- 28 lower ranks
5	brigadier generals	
8	major generals	
6	lieutenant generals	
2	generals (full)	- 21 generals

The members given under 2 are the result of what could be ascertained at the present.

signed August W i n t e r
.....

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of July 1946

signed : Paul R. Foster
.....
2nd Lt. O - 1335262

I, K. Likowska, being thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of the above affidavit.

signed : Kveta Likovska
.....

RANKS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE "GROUP"
at the time of foreign political decisions 1935 - 1939

	Military Sovereignty 1935	Rhineland Occupation 1936	Austria 1938	Sudetenland Fall 1938	Protectorate 1939	Poland 1939
Gen. F.M. KEITEL						Col. Gen.
Generaloberst JODL						Brig. Gen.
Gen. WARLEMONT						Colonel
Lt. Gen. WINTER	Capt.	Capt.	Major	Major	Major	Lt. Col.
Gen. F.M. v. BRAUCHITSCH	Gen. of the Art.					Col. Gen.
Col. Gen. HALDER						Gen. Art.
Col. Gen. ZEITZLER						Col.
Col. Gen. GUDERIAN			Lt. Gen.	Gen. of Armored Forces	Gen. of Armored Forces	Gen. of Armored Forces
Grand Admiral RAEDER	Admiral	Gen. Adm.	Gen. Adm.	Gen. Adm.	Grand Adm.	Grand Adm.
Grand Admiral DOENITZ	Commander	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)
Gen. Adm. SCHNIEWIND	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.
Admiral FRICKE	Cdr.	Cdr.	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)
Admiral MEISEL	Cdr.	Cdr.	Cdr.	Cdr.	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)
Reich Marshal GOERING						Gen. F. M.
Col. Gen. STUMPFF	Col. (?)		Gen. Air Force	Gen. Air Force	Gen. Air Force	Gen. Air Force
Gen. KREIPE			Cpt.	Cpt.	Cpt.	Major
Gen. KOLLER	Police Cpt.	Cpt.	Major	Major	Major	Major
Gen. ALMENDINGER	Lt. Col.	Lt. Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen. DE ANGELIS			Col.	Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen.
Col. Gen. v. ARNIM	Lt. Col.	Col.	Col.			Brig. Gen.
Gen. BALCK						Lt. Col.
Col. Gen. BLASKOWITZ	Gen. Inf.	Gen. Inf.	Gen. Inf.	Gen. Inf.	Gen. Inf.	Gen. Inf.
Gen. BLUMENTRITT	Lt. Col.	Lt. Col.	Lt. Col.	Lt. Col.		Col.
Gen. BOEGE						Col. (?)
Gen. BOEHME			Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen.		Lt. Gen.
Gen. BRANDENBERGER						Col.
Gen. BUSSE	Cpt.	Maj.	Maj.	Maj.	Maj.	Lt. Col.

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H0815-0065

	Military Sovereignty 1935	Rhine-land occu-pation 1936	Austria 1938	Sudeten-landFall 1938	Protectora-te 1939	Poland 1939
Gen.FOERTSCH			Lt.Col.			Col.
Gen.v.d.CHEVALLERIE						Col.
Obergruppenfuehrer DIETRICH	Regi-mental Comman-der	Reg. Cdr.	Reg. Cdr.	Reg. Cdr.	Reg. Cdr.	Reg. Cdr.
Gen.FRETTER-PICO	Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Col.Gen.FRIESNER						Col.
Gen.GRAESER						Lt.Col.
Gen.HANSEN			Lt.Col.			Lt.Gen.
Col.Gen.HARPE			Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen.HASSE						Col.
Obergruppenfuehrer HAUSSER						
Col.Gen.HEINRICI						Lt.Gen.
Gen.HILPERT						Brig-Gen.
Col.Gen.HOLLIDT						Brig-Gen.
Gen.HOSSBACH			Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Col.Gen.HOTH			Lt.Gen.			Gen.Inf.
Col.Gen.JASCHKE			Col.			Col.
Gen.F.M.KESSELRING						Gen.Air-For
Gen.CHRISTIANSEN						
Col.Gen.v.FALKENHORST	Col.	Brig-Gen.	Lt.Gen.	Lt.Gen.	Lt.Gen.	Lt.Gen.
Gen.KLEFFEL						Brig.Gen.
Gen.F.M.v.KLEIST	Lt.Gen.	Gen.Kav.				Gen.Kav.
Gen.v.KNOBELSDORFF	Col.	Col.	Col.			Brig-Gen.
Gen.KREYSING						Lt.Col.
Gen.KUEBLER						Brig.Gen.
GenF.M.v.KUECHLER	Gen.Art.		Gen.Art.			Gen.Art.
Gen.F.M.Ritter v.LEEB	Gen.Art.					Gen.
Gen.[illegible]SEN				Brig-Gen.	Brig.Gen.	Brig-Gen.

	Military Sovereignty 1935	Rhineland Occupation 1936	Austria 1938	Sudetenland Fall 1938	Protectorate 1939	Poland 1939
Col.Gen. LINDEMANN			Brig. Gen.			Lt.Gen.
Gen.F.M. LIST				Gen.	Col.Gen.	Col.Gen.
Gen. LOCH						
Col.Gen. LOEHR						Gen.Air Force
Gen. LUCHT			Col.			Col.
Col.Gen.v.MACKENSEN						Brig.Gen.
Gen.F.M.v.MANSTEIN	Col.	Col.	Brig. Gen.	Lt. Gen.	Lt.Gen.	Lt.Gen.
Gen.v.MANTEUFEL	Capt.	Major	Maj.	Maj.	Maj.	Maj.
Gen.MUELLER,Friedr.						
Gen.NEHRING	Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen.v.OBSTFELDER			Lt.Gen.			Lt.Gen.
Gen.F.M.PAULUS	Lt.Col.		Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen.RASP						Lt.Col.
Col.Gen.RAUSS			Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Col.Gen.REINHARDT	Col.	Col.	Brig. Gen.	Brig. Gen.	Lt.Gen.	Lt.Gen.
Col.Gen.RENDULIC			Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen.F.M.v.RUNDSTEDT						Col.Gen.
Col.Gen.RUOFF				Lt.Gen.	Lt.Gen.	Gen.Inf.
Col.Gen.v.SALMUTH						Brig.Gen.
Gen.v.SAUCKEN						Lt.Col.
Col.Gen.SCHMIDT	Col.	Col.	Brig. Gen?	Brig. Gen.	Lt.Gen?	Lt.Gen.
Gen.SCHLEMM						Lt.Col.?
Gen.F.M.SCHOERNER						Lt.Col.
Gen.SCHULZ,Friedr.						Lt.Col.
Gen.v.Sodenstern						Brig.Gen.
Obergruppenfuehrer STEINER						
Col.Gen.STRAUSS			Lt.Gen.			Gen.Inf.

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	Military Sovereignty 1935	Rhineland Occupation 1936	Austria 1938	Sudetenland Fall 1938	Protectorate 1939	Poland 1939
Col.Gen. STUDENT						
Gen. v.TIPPELSKIRCH			Lt.Col.			Brig.Gen.
Gen.v.VIETINGHOFF						Lt.Gen.
Gen.F.M. v.WEICHS			Gen.Kav.			Gen.Kav.
Col.Gen. WEISS	Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen. WENCK	Captain	Capt.	Capt.	Capt.	Maj.	Maj.
Gen. WIESE						Lt.Col.
Gen. WOEHLER	Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen. v.ZANGEN	Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen.Adm.BOEHM	Rear Adm.	Vice Adm.	Adm.	Adm.	Adm.	Adm.
Adm. CILIAX	Commander	Cdr.	Capt. (Nav)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)
Adm. DENSCH	Captain (Nav.)	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Vice Adm.	Vice Adm.
Adm. FOERSTER	Commander	Cdr.	Cpt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)
Adm.GUSE	Capt. (Nav.)	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Vice Adm.	Vice Adm.
Adm.KRANCKE	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)
Gen.Adm.KUMMETZ	Commander	Cdr.	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)
Vice Adm.LOEWISCH	Commander	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)
Gen.Adm.MARSCHALL	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.
Gen.Adm.SAALWAECHTER	Rear Adm.	Vice Adm.	Vice Adm.	Vice Adm.	Adm.	Adm.
Adm. SCHMUNDT	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Capt. (Nav.)	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.
Adm. SCHUSTER	Capt. (Nav.)	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Rear Adm.	Vice Adm.	Vice Adm.
Col.Gen. DESSLOCH	Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Col.	Col.	Col.	Brig.Gen.
Col.Gen. KELLER	Col.					Lt.Gen.(?)
Gen.PFLUGBEIL	Lt.Col.					Brig.Gen.
Gen.SEIDEL	Major		Lt.Col.	Lt.Col.	Col.	Col.
Gen.F.M.SPERRLE	Col.(?)	Brig. Gen.	Gen.of Air Force	Gen.Air Force	Gen.Air Force	Gen.Air Force

H0815-0068

Fuehrer - Decree

No. 1

(Document K 1)

H0815-0069

Document K 1

Fuehrer-Decree No 1

The contents of the so-called Fuehrer-Decree No. 1 were as follows:

a)
"No one shall have knowledge of secret matters which do not pertain to his own sphere of duty.

b)
No one shall find out more than is necessary to carry out the duties assigned to him.

c)
No one is to receive information earlier than is necessary for the tasks assigned to him.

d)
No one is to pass on orders which are to be kept secret, neither more nor earlier than is absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose."

This wording is given from memory. Thus it is possible that there is a slight deviation from the words of the text, but the contents are correctly represented.

This "Fuehrerbefehl" was posted in every office-room.

H0815-0070

E X C E R P T

from

Doc. - No. 386 PS (USA 25)

pp. 9 and 10

H0815-0071

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov. 37 from 1615 - 2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr.h.c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v.NEURATH
Oberst HOSSBACH.

.....

Fieldmarshal von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that ENGLAND and FRANCE must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with ITALY would not bind the French army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to Commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von FRITSCH estimated the French forces which would presumable be employed on the ALPINE frontier against ITALY to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the RHINELAND. We should consider the lead which FRANCE has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications- which was pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von BLOMBERG- the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Fieldmarshal von BLOMBERG drew special attention to the strength of the CZECHOSLOVAK fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a MAGINOT line

H0815-0072

and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von FRITSCH mentioned that it was the purpose of study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovaki system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that ow to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarshal von BLOMBERG and Generaloberst von FRITSCH regarding ENGLAND and FRANCE's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of BRITAIN's non-participation and the consequently he did not believe in military action by FRANCE against GERMANY. Should the MEDITERRANEAN conflict alread mentioned lead to a general mobilization in EUROPE, then we shoul have to commence operations against CZECHOSLOVAKIA immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war shoul declare their disinterestedness, then GERMANY, would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.
In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst GOERING considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in SPAIN. The Fuehrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed fro a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(Signed) Hossbach

14 November 1945

I, E.GLAZIER, P/O/, 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No.386 PS.

E.GLAZIER
P/O, 37371

H0815-0073

E X T R A C T

USA-72

from document 1780 PS - Jodls Diary

Entry of 28 Sept 1938

H0815-0074

Entry of 28 Sept 1938:

"28 September, Gravest day.

.....

Commander-in-chief of the Army besieges chief OKW, pointing out his responsibility, to do his utmost with the Fuehrer that we do not go beyond the Sudeten German territory"

- - - - - - - - -

H0815-0075

E X C E R P T

from Document 789-PS (USA 23)

pp. 1, 2, 11, 12.

H0815-0076

23 November 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

Page 2

.....After that the order for rearmament. Here again ther were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.
One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campai First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first.....

Page 11

.....A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

H0815-0077

If - as it was in 1914 - the Supreme Commanders have nervou breakdowns what can we expect from the ordinary rifleman.

Only result of deliberation: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-existence of the nation.

I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons

1) The decision is irrevocable.

2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men o German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unshamed if I have to die.

I, FRED NIELBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 789-PS.

3 October 1945

FRED NIELBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H0815-0078

Filed August 21, 1946

Guenther Blumentritt
General Infantry

DOCUMENT MIL 12

11 June 1946

AFFIDAVIT

I, Guenther Blumentritt, born on 10 February 1892 in Munich deposes in place of oath as follows:

"Jurisdiction of a Commander-in-Chief (Army) of an army. The following example shows truthfully how uniform jurisdiction of a "Commander-in-Chief" (see attached chart) was sabotaged.

This example is by no means arbitrarily constructed. I myself was from 3 Februar 1945 to 27 March 1945 "Commander-in-Chief of the 25th army" in Holland.

I had under my command:

a) Inf Div of the Army
b) Navy Land units of the Navy
c) Airforce Field Divisions
d) SS.

I only had the "jurisdiction" over a), the Army divisions, as I and my staff were Army officers. Incidents of a disciplinary kind in the Navy were investigated and dealt with it by her, in the SS b the Gigher SS and Police Leader with the National Commissioner. Incidents in the Airforce units had to be transferred to the left adjacent unit, that was the Parachute A.O.K.1, which was under the Reichsmarshal.

Similar examples can be found everywhere, where

a) Army units
b) Navy units
c) Airforce units (incl. Parachute troops, Airforce field divisions, etc)

H0815-0079

d) SS units,
e) OT (Organisation Todt) and Reich Labor Service
f) from 1944 on, "Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen"

because of their position within the area of an army used in a joint operation. The "Commander-in-Chief" was, when he came from the Army, which was usually the case, only "appointing authority" for his "army units". The above mentioned different types of units had also tactically their own message channel, reported besides the Army directly to their highest commands. Even the food was different for A) to f)

signed: Blumentritt

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June 46

signed: Robert B. Stannes
1st Lt 01384783

I, Paul Schmidt, duly conversant with the English and German languages certify that I have acted as interpreter for the swearing of above affidavit.

signed: Dr. Paul Schmidt

H0815-0080

Jurisdiction of a Commander in Chief (example)



1. Parachute Division (Air-Force)	only to the III Parachute Corps
6.Inf.Div. (Army)	only to the Commander in Chief
Volksgrenadier Division (Army and SS)	only to the Commander in Chief with report to Himmler
1. Air Force Field Div. (Air-Force)	only to the Air-Force
8. Inf.Div. (Army).	only to the Commander in Chief
2. SS-Div. (SS)	only to the SS
3. Parachute Div. (Air-Force)	only to the Air-Force
2. Naval Division (Navy)	only to the Navy
50.Inf.Div. (Army)	to the I.Army Corps and Commander in Chief

The "Commander-in-Chief" (Army) has therefore only "jurisdiction" over:
I.Army Corps (Army), 50.Inf.Div.(Army) 8.Inf.Div.(Army) Volksgrenadier Division (Half Army, half Himmler), 6.Inf.Div.(Army)
He has no jurisdiction over II.SS Corps and III. Parachute Corps (Air Force) and not over 2.Naval Div. (Navy), 3.Parachute Division (AirForce), 2.SS Division (SS) 1.Air Force Field Div. (Air Force), 1.Parachute Div.(Air Force), Volks Grenadier Div., only with simultaneous report to Himmler.

H0815-0081

Testimony of AIR Force General

K o l l e r

of 25 March 1946
(Doc. Jo.58)

H0815-0082

C o p y

Prof. Dr. EXNER
Defense Counsel A. Jodl

Nurnberg, 4 January 19.

New draft (Alteration fig.2)

To General of the Air Force KOLLER
lately Chief of the General Staff of the German Luftwaffe (Berchtesgaden)

1.) Since when have you been Chief of the General Staff of the German Luftwaffe ?

2.) Is it known to you, that under your predecessor, the late General KORTEN, the Führer in June 1944 ordered following question to be examined?
Are orders to be given to leave to the fury of the populace certain low-flying aviators who act contrary to international law ? (This refers to aviators who attack the civilian population, hospitals and military hospitals, also trains engaged in public traffic.)

3.) Is it true that no such order was issued ?

4.) Is it known to you that the Chief of the Wehrmacht operational staff had this question which was raised by GOEBBELS carefully examined and came to the conclusion that such an order could not and should not be issued because:
a) These low-flying aviators actually never were taken alive, but that there was only
b) the danger that all enemy aviators who bailed out would be dealt with in the same way.

5.) Do you recall that about March 1945 in the air raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery the Führer reproached you and the Luftwaffe because such an order was not given?

(signed) EXNER.

H0815-0083

Dr. Exner
Defense Counsel A.JODL

25 March 1946

To your inquiry of 4 January 1946, I state as follows:

1. From 1 September 1943 until 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the Air Force Operational Staff, from 23 Novem ber 1944 Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.

2. I was not personally present when this instruction was given by the Führer I recall however that General KORTEN once told me that the Führer intented to delive the aviators mentioned to popular fury and we repeat- edly discussed the matter at length. We agreed in the absolute rejection of this intention. Our reasons were substantially:
   a) International law (Articles of war),
   b) Unsoldierly, unbecoming intention contrary to all military principles,
   c) Source of numerous misunderstandings, through whic other enemy and friendly aircraft crews also would surely come to harm,
   d) Consequences to our own (German) aircraft crews, instigation of counter-measures on the part of the enemy, which we could not be answerable for either towards our own crews nor towards their dependents,
   e) Obtaining of news.

   The event in my opinion occured about the beginning of July in BERCHTESGADEN. Thus not long before the removal back to Wolfschanze. Owing to subsequent event "Attempt on the Führer's life events in connection therewith, death of General KORTEN, change in chiefs, and my departure from the High Command of the Air Forc (OKL", I lost sight of the matter at the time.

3. Such an order to my knowledge was not been given as that time, certainly not by the Wehrmacht Operation Staff, which in my opinion would not at all have been competent.

   At any rate I cannot recall having seen such an or

4. It is not known to me what Colonel-General JODL as Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff ordered with- in the compass of his competency in the Wehrmacht High Command regarding examination of this question. With my knowledge of the personality of the General and the great care he exercised in all such difficult questions, I assume a thorough examination of the question on his part as true, correct and quite self-evident for General JODL.

5. Yes, I remember quite exactly:
   a) About the beginning to the middle of March 1945, during the situation report a notice taken from the Allied Press Reporter Survey was laid before t Führer by BORMANN. It read somewhat

H0815-0084

to this effect:

An American combat aviation crew shot down over Germany a short time previously was overtaken by advancing American troops. They had declared that they were mishandled by indignant persons of the population, had been threatened with death and probably would have been killed, if German soldiers had not delivered them and taken them under their protection.

BORMANN further pointed out to the Führer in a few words that this confirmed that soldiers in such cases step in against the population.

b) HITLER, rather angry, turned to me and said excitedly " I have already once ordered that bailing-out bombe crews are not to be protected against the populatio These people only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should take measures to protect these murderers against their own population whic is acting from justified hate. Why were my orders not carried out?"

Surprised by this attack I replied somewhat like this: "I know of no such order, moreover it would be a practica impossibility."

HITLER turning toward me expressed himself, very lou and sharply.

"The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the cowardice of the Luftwaffe, because the gentlemen of the Luftwaffe are cowards and are afraid that sor thing might also happen to them. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly agreement between the Luftwaffe and the British and American fliers."

HITLER turned then also to KALTENBRUNNER who happened to be present in the background and speaking to/while partly looking at me continued:
him

"I hereby order that all bomber crews bailed-out in the last few months and also all bomber crews bailing-out in the future are to be turned over by the Luftwaffe to theSD and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone who does not carry out my orders or who takes action against the population will be punished with death and is himsel to be shot."

HITLER then further expressed in a general way his indignation and his conception. The assembled officers made a general impression of surprise and disapproval.

H0815-0085

c) After the Fuehrer's entourage had passed on, I requested an interview with KALTENBRUNNER in the side passage way.

Essential points :

KOLLER : It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Luftwaffe will have no more to do with it. I, under no circumstances, and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal. It is entirely out of the question that the Luftwaffe puts its hand to it in any way.

KALTENBRUNNER: The Fuehrer has completely wrong ideas. Also, the duties of the S.D. are continually misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the S.D. Moreover no German soldier would do what the Fuehrer demands. That is not in the German soldier's line. He does not kill prisoners; if individual fanatical party followers of Herr BORMANN try to do so, the German soldier interferes. The Fuehrer has a completely false picture of the attitude of our soldiers. Moreover, I will also do nothing in the matter myself. It would not occur to me at all. We must only see how we can get out of it, otherwise he will have a few of us transferred among the first. We must gain time. In one way or the other, I am going to leave Berlin immediately for a fairly long time.

KOLLER : Then we are agreed on the main point, You leaving Berlin is propitious. But we must have another way out as far as the Fuehrer is concerned, for it is possible that he may come back to his order tomorrow. Later on, if it gets worse and worse, we will have to see how to prevent the business, or what is going to happen to us.

It was decided at my suggestion that no order along the lines commandad by the Fuehrer will be given to the Luftwaffe and the S.D. None was given to the S.D. In case the Fuehrer should revert to his order again, then, first of all, prevent further action thru explanations of the following kind.

All previously captured prisoners belonging to flying crews must not be handed over to the Luftwaffe, but scattered everywhere around under the control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE); time of capture not to be centrally known. Therefore, the establishment of the number of air personnel captured during the last months would be very difficult and time-consuming. Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go automatically to interrogation centers. Those are in a state of moving, owing to operations. Liaison is bad.

H0815-0086

Therefore, detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the intelligence officer of the Luftwaffe (Ic des OKL) should go to a delegate of KALTENBRUNNER, who, however, would first have to be appointed.

d) After the Fuehrer's entourage, I spoke to Field Marshal KEITEL in the entrance of the air raid shelter and said:

"The Fuehrer's order is insane (Keitel remarked in between: "One can certainly call it that"). The Luftwaffe shall keep her escutcheon clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order and moreover with such a threat of punishment, only verbally. To an order of this kind he has to sign his own name. Whether or not it will then be carried out is an open question, in any case not by the Luftwaffe. Nor by the SD., either I have spoken with KALTENBRUNNER.

Field Marshal KEITEL:

"He will not sign such orders then, and the OKW always has to endorse everything. But I will be damned if I issu such an order."

KOLLER:

"The Luftwaffe cannot join in this under any circumstance: We will never assume such a responsibility."

Field Marshal KEITEL:

"You are right. I neither. I must think over what I can do about it and how." The conversation was interrupted because KEITEL was called to the telephone. KEITEL was very indignant and annoyed about the Fuehrer's order.

c) After refreshments in a corner of the air raid shelter I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to go to the cloakroom and the way out. HITLER by chance came out of the room, gave an order to an orderly and called me as I was passing by. The door to the conference room was open, Ley was sitting at the table.

HITLER said to me:

"I came back to my order once more. All of you must help me, it cannot go on like this any longer. The Luftwaffe o at least the Reich defense has failed. What am I to do against the frightful bombing terrorism which is only murdering German women and children."

KOLLER:

"The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and what is humanly possible. The neglect of air armament by us, the momentary technical and numerical superiority of the enemy, can not be eliminated or altered overnight. When the searchlight-units finally become stronger, the air situation over Germany will improve for us."

HITLER:

"I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible before the German people for the continuation of this air situation

H0815-0087

If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will think it over before flying here."

KOLLER:

"It certainly will not improve the air situation, but on the contrary, make it worse."

HITLER:

"No, what the Japanese have done is the right thing.

In contrast to his behaviour at the gathering, HITLER was quiet again. He displayed an affable manner. From experience, one could talk with him better alone, than in presence of other people. I though it was a good opportunity to attack the whole problem and declared: "If I am permitted to express my point of view, it is that this will not do. Such measures are in such brutal opposition to the education, feelings and thinking of all soldiers, that they cannot be carried out. One cannot fill soldiers with the articles of war and decent conduct and then order actions which go against everybody's grain. You must not forget, my Fuehrer, that the enemy fliers also carry out orders and do their duty just as ours. If they are shot down or make crash landings, they are just defenseless and unarmed prisoners. How would we stand before the world? And the first measures of the enemy would be to treat our flying crews the same way. That is something we cannot answer for to our men and their relatives All their willingness to serve and their discipline would collapse at one blow."

Up to that point the Fuehrer had not interrupted me. After he had at first looked at me, he turned his look away, and seemed to be lost in his thoughts. But he had been listening and interrupted me here, and said quietly and in an earnest manner:

"And so the Luftwaffe is still afraid. That is indeed quite all right, but I am responsible for the protection of the German people, and have no other means except this."

HITLER turned around and went back into the conference room.

f) After my arrival at the Luftwaffe Headquarter (Kurfuerst) I informed Colonel von BRAUCHITSCH of the events and ordered him to report to the Reich Marshal about it as soon as possible. I myself could not reach the Field Marshal at that moment. During our conversation BRAUCHITSCH also expressed a disapproving attitude towards the Fuehrer's order.

g) Some one or two hours later the Field Marshal called me and began his conversation with the following words:

"Tell me, has he finally gone completely mad, "

H0815-0088

It was very clear who was meant. I personally reported once more to the Reich Marshal about the principal happenings and the conversation with KALTENBRUNNER and added:

I will not carry out this order or any activity connected with it. I will take pains to handle the situation so as to gain time first of all, in any case, and do everything possible to prevent any of us from falling under the wheels. Perhaps after the last conference the Fuehrer will not come back to his order any more. If he does, however, it will be very hard, and you will have to go to the Fuehrer yourself. What the Fuehrer has ordered must not be allowed to happen in any case.

The Reich Marshal expressed himself as very much opposed to HITLER's attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act as had been suggested, to inform him immediately at the proper time, and ended his conversation with these words:
"This is all insane and cannot be carried out."

h) Measures against allied fliers on the basis of the above-mentioned Fuehrer's order have been adopted neither by the Luftwaffe, nor by the SD. This order has not been made known, in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or their offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Fuehrer's meeting and the order has not been passed on by the Army High Command (OKH).

HITLER did not come back to his order later, either with the Reich Marshal, or with myself or my representation. Nor, I think, with KALTENBRUNNER, either. To be sure, I have never spoken to the latter again about this matter. Whether HITLER deliberately let the matter drop, or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events, I was unable to judge.

i) Perhaps 2 or 3 weeks later, there came to my knowledge a directive of the OKW, (I think,a teletype), in which, as I recall, mention was made of the eye-witness report (Reporterbericht) that had given occasion to it. In it was disclosed that the Fuehrer had expressed his displeasure, that German soldiers had acted against their own people.

No mention was made of the main point of HITLER's order. If I remember correctly, the order was signed by KEITEL and is not to be regarded as anything else than an attempt to cover himself as far as the Fuehrer was concerned. In my opinion, General JODL had nothing to do with the whole affair.

(handwritten signature) KARL KOLLER

signed: Karl KOLLER

General of the Air Force.

H0815-0089

Document Mil 14

Filed August 21, 1946

Extract

from "Documents of German Politics"

Volume 9, Part I, Pages 158 - 166

H0815-0090

Page 158-159:

The Chief of
the High-Command of the Wehrmacht. F.H.Qu., the 11 May 1941
WFST/Abt.L.(I Op) Confidential
N.00 886/41 g.Kdos. Command Business

To the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.

My Dear Reich Minister:

The High Command of the Wehrmacht has been observing for months with continuously increasing anxiety, the development of the deployment of Russian military forces along the German eastern frontier.

According to our reports there were, when the war broke out in 1939, about 77 Russian Infantry-Divisions in European Russia, of these little more then half in the west Russian frontier area. After the termination of the Polish campaign this number increased to 114. Where as the High Command of the Wehrmacht at the time saw some reason for this measure in the, though almost peaceful occupation of Eastern-Poland by Russian troops, it observed with proportionately greater estrangement, after the termination of this operation according to plans, the further increase of this number to 121.

Since the beginning of the year nearly daily reports arrived at the High Command of the Wehrmacht from all parts of the frontier, amounting in their comprehensive evaluation to a very considerable concentration of Russian troops along the German eastern frontier.

H0815-0091

By ruthlessly transporting infantry, motorized and tank divisions from the Asiatic area and Caucasia - specially after conclusion of the Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact - the number of the observed infantry divisions only had on 1 May 1941 increased in European Russia to 143. Of these 119 divisions were in the German-Russian frontier-area.

With the tank-brigades and tank-divisions this growing formation of a center of gravity was still more noticeable. From the beginning of the year nearly all motorized and tank units ever observed are in western Russia. Thereto are to be added 20 more cavalry divisions and several parachutist-batallions.

The same development is to be seen in the Russian air force. Together with the ever increasing accumulation of light aviation units to assist the army, the speedy constructions of the air-fields and maintenance organization close to the frontier allows to recognize a preparation of far-reaching bombing attacks into the German Reich of strong combat air units.

Further the High Command of the Wehrmacht again draws attention to the repeated remarks of high Sowjet-Russian officers, who, on manoeuvres openly speak of an early Russian offensive. The High Command of the Wehrmacht, influenced by these facts and connected with them the violations of the frontier by Soviet-Russian planes and soldiers, continuousl, reported to the German Foreign Office, has come to the conclusion, that this dimension of the Russian concentration of troops practically amounting to a mobilisation at the

H0815-0092

German eastern frontier can but be interpreted as a preparation from Russian offensive measures of major dimensions. The danger of an armed conflict therefore approaches menacingly.

The approximately terminated concentration of the Soviet Russian army permits their government the free choice of the beginning of the attack. Corresponding German counter - measures have now become inevitable.

Heil Hitler

Yours obediently

signed Keitel.

H0815-0093

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Wehrmacht High Command,
Foreign No.212/41 g.Kdos.Chefs.
Chief's matter

Berlin, 11 June 1941
Secret Command Matter
Only through officer-

To the Reich Cabinet, through the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Wehrmacht High Command kept the Reich Cabinet continually informed about the military attitude of Soviet Russia, constantly growing more menacing. Although the political attitude of the Soviet Union showed a changing face and there were no essential reasons for objections in complying with agreements in the economic field, it was, however, clearly established in the meantime that the military measures of the Soviet Union were distinctly focussed toward preparations for an attack on the German Reich.

This development which led to a major concentration of Red Army troops form the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea appears as follows: There was no reason for anxiety yet for the Security of the German Eastern border at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940. The Soviet Union showed an outwardly friendly attitude at the liquidation of Poland. Already at the beginning of 1940, however, it was noticed with apprehension that the Soviet Union not only started to fortify strongly her Western border, that it not only created the well known dead zone along the border and arraged for the transportation of the

H0815-0094

industry into the interior, but that she constant re-forced her border troops.

On 1 September 1939 in the territory west of the Archangelsk Kalinin-Poltawas Western tip of the Crimea line. there had stood:

44 Infantry Divisions,
20 Cavalry Divisions and
3 motorized and Tank Brigades.

Because of the Polish campaign the Soviet Union reinforced these troops by 28 November 1939 by 47 Divisions and motoriz: and Tank Brigades to

76 Infantry Divisions,
21 Cavalry Divisions and
17 motorized and Tank Brigades.

In spite of the conclusion of the Polish campaign, however, the reinforcements continued extensively. By 12 March 1940 at least 16 more, probably even 25 Divisions and motorized Brigades were newly added. Accordingly, the entire strenght of the Soviet Russian troops in the Western border Zone was by middle of March 1940:

86 - 95 Infantry Divisions,
22 Cavalry Divisions and
22 motorized and Tank Brigades.

At first the co-operation of the German with the Soviet Russian authorities on the new border in the former Poland seemed to work well and smoothly, but

H0815-0095

in the winter of 1939/40 serious incidents became more frequent. These incidents revealed an evidently unfavourable and hostile attitude of the Soviet Russian border troops towards the Germans. There was no reason for their conduct as the Germans showed openly their friendly intentions and strove for peaceful cooperation on the border. While the German border violations mostly prooved insignificant and unintentional, the Soviet Russian border violations were more numerous, incomparably more serious and quite often resulted in people killed on German territory. Only upon stern protest by the German Reich Cabinet the Soviet Russian border violation subsided at least at times.

When the Baltic States were occupied by Soviet Russia a maximum strength of 70 000 occupation troops in all had been agreed upon by treaty. Therefore, on 28 November 1939 the stronght of the occupation forces was 53 000 men and on 1 February 1940 it was 57 500 men. The occupation took place without any opposition being offered; also in the following time of occupation situations never arose which would have necessitated the re-inforcement of military occupation forces by Soviet Russia. In spite of it the Soviet Union, after it had completely incorporated the three countries, undertook to occupy these territories with exceedingly powerful forces of all branches of the armed forces. In early summer of 1940 the occupation had reached a total strength of 250 000 troops at the present time about 650 000 troops are stationed in the territory of the former Baltic States.

H0815-0096

Another serious threat to Germany was the concentration of strong Russian forces along the Russia-Roumanian border which started in October 1940. When, in September 1940, at the request of the Roumanian government at that time the sending out of a German military mission to Roumania was considered and later carried out, the USSR government used this circumstance as motive to concentrate and leave a considerable amount of Army and Airforce troops in Bessarabia and in the Bukowina along the Roumanian border. The task of these forces was to lessen the German influence in the Balkans by using pressure on the Balkan States and thereby to destroy Germany's peaceful intentions in the Balkans. When British forces appeared in Greece, in increasing strength the task of the Russian forces on the Roumanian border, however, obviously became to interfere in the armed conflicts, which had become unavoidable after the Belgrade uprising of 27 March 1941, and, proceeding in a westerly direction, make contact with the Jugoslavian forces, as well as to cut off the German forces from their supply lines. Preliminary instructions for aggressive actions were furnished, air fields layed out, supply bases provided, tank groups brought on, the lines of communications improved and numerous possibilities procured to advance over the mountains to the border. These planes were frustrated only through the fast and decisive successes achieved by the German forces.

H0815-0097

An unbroken chain of violations of the sovereignty of the German borderline by Soviet Russian Air-Force can be traced right through the years of 1940 and 1941. Thus, alone in May 1941 the German border was trespassed by Soviet Russian planes 27 times. Even violations of the border by Soviet Russian soldiers occurred again with the beginning of 1941 and gradually assumed unbearable proportions.

The following statement gives an impressive picture of the extraordinary Soviet Russian troop concentrations on the western border:

1 September 1939:

44 Infantry divisions
20 Cavalry divisions
3 motorized and armoured brigades
(total about 65 divisions)

28 November 1939:

76 Infantry divisions
21 Cavalry divisions
17 motorized and armoured brigades
(total about 106 divisions)

1 May 1941:

118 Infantry divisions
20 Cavalry divisions
40 motorized and armoured brigades
(total about 158 divisions).

H0815-0098

In view of these troop concentrations of the Red army the O.K.W. saw itself compelled to transfer a considerable strength of troops. This regrouping of troops was caused directly and exclusively by the threatening Soviet Russian troops concentrations. The threat for Germany, growing out of this concentration of the Soviet Russian army, corresponds to the spirit, hostile to everything German, which was cultivated, consistently stirred up and kept alive through hostile propaganda in the Soviet Russian army. Countless reports of friendly and neutral observers will bear out these facts.

Thus it is evident, that the concentration of the Red army is essentially considered to be concluded. Of a total of

170 Infantry Divisions
33 1/2 Cavalry Divisions
46 motorized and armoured brigades

there are on the western borderline:

118 Infantry Divisions
20 Cavalry Divisions
40 motorized and armoured brigades,

in the rest of European Russia however there are only

27 Infantry Divisions
5 1/2 Cavalry Divisions
1 motorized and armoured brigade,

H0815-0099

in the Far East only

25 Infantry divi sions,

8 Cavalry divisions,

5 motorized and armoured brigades.

So it appears, that the Russian concentration was continually pushed on toward the border. Individual units of the army and the air force spread out within their sectors. Airdromes near the border were occupied by strong units of the air force.

Reconai ssance activity increased markedly and has in part been carried out by the highest ranking officers wi th huge staffs.

All these facts, coupled with the will for destruction of Germany, cultivated in the Russian armed forces, necessarily force to the conclusion, that the Soviet Union is preparing, to enter upon an attack against the Greater German Reich at a moment most suitable to her.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht

/s./ Keitel.

H0815-0100

Page 164-166:

Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. Berlin, June 20th 41
Operations division/sect.L(I Op) Secret Command matter
No 001 161/41 g.K.

Concerns: Soviet Russian frontier violations.
To : The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Auswaertiges Amt
for Herr Ambassador Ritter personally.

Armed Russian soldiers have crossed the Russian border on June 17th 1941 at 8.25 hours, in the sector of the German VIth army corps, at a point east of Rominten Heath near Eiszeryszki (15 km. west of Kavarija) and have operated under cover on German territory. When German pickets shot at the Russian soldiers, they went under cover. After a short combat, the Russian retired anew to their own territory.

In connection with the deployment of Soviet Russian forces, which is particularly massive opposite Eastern Prussia, this incident is another symptom of the provocative intentions of Soviet Russia.

Opposite the frontier section Suwalki-Memel only, and since June 11th of the current year, the presence of 20 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions and 5 armored brigades has been unobjectionably established.

In the salient around Bialystok, which bulges far out in a Western direction, 19 infantry divisions, 7 cavalry divisions, 1 armored division and 5 armored brigades are concentrated.

H0815-0101

Behind them, around Baranowitschi, a reserve army of 10 infantry divisions and 2 armored brigades is concentrated. That prooves that at any moment a huge Soviet Russian armed force, divided into 4 armies and comprising

49 infantry divisions (many of them motorized)
3 armored divisions
12 armored brigades
7 cavalry divisions

can start operations from an Eastern and South-Eastern direction against Eastern Prussia and the region of the estuary of Bug and Narew, to the North of Warsaw. According to reports at hand concerning the strength of the Soviet Russian airfield North of the Pripet swamps, such an attack can be supported by nearly 2000 airplanes. It has been explained at large to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on May 11th, that Soviet Russian forces are concentrated in a similar, if not so pronounced, massive formation, along the whole of the remaining Eastern front too. The picture of the military situation caused by the deployment of Soviet forces has shown any change, during the las weeks, only insofar as there are concentrated in Southern Bessarabia mobile forces only(armored divisions and brigades and motorized and cavalry divisions)which fact clearly permits to guess at offensive intentions. Finally, the Suprome Command of the Wehrmacht must say that such a military situation towards a country with which there exists a friendship pact, can be called unique.

H0815-0102

There cannot be any doubt that for months Soviet Russia has considered this pact but as a cover, in order to execute, in the interests of England, and as far as possi unhindered, the hugest military deployment of her history against Germany.

The security of the Reich makes it imperative to remove this danger without delay.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Wehrmacht
by order: (signed) Jodl.

H0815-0103

Excerpt

from PS 1809
(GB 88)

C o p y

Diary General J o d l (WFA):

for the period from: 1 February - 26 May 1940

.....

Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian concentration of forces against Bessarabia.

.....

H0815-0104

E X C E R P T

from Document 447 - PS (USA 135)

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H0815-0105

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TOP SECRET

OKW
Armed Forces Operational Staff

Top Secret
Only through officer:

Section L (IV/ Qu)
44125/41 Top Secret

Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941

5 copies

4th copy

Orders.

Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L (I) #33408/40 Top Secr 18 December 1940.

Directives for Special Area

To Order #21

(Case Barbarossa)

I. Area of Operations and executive power.

. . . . . .

2.) The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded.

From this the following is inferred:

a) The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.

b) In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political system.

H0815-0106

Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shal not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehr SS.

c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North(Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

3.) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

.....

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 447-PS.

16 October 1945

WILLARD EVANS SKIMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590